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ABSTRACT 
In 2008 Tanzania was selected to be amongst the countries that would be 
implementing the REDD Project in its piloting phase as a way of demonstrating 
how the future REDD would look like. It was selected because of the existence of 
participatory institutional setup as well as the presence of the big tropical forest 
cover. Currently, there are nine REDD+ pilot projects implemented in Tanzania, 
which are also financed by the Norwegian Government through its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the roles ascribed to villagers and how 
villagers perceived the ascribed roles in one of the REDD+ pilot projects 
implemented in the Kolo Hills forests in Kondoa District, Dodoma, Tanzania. 
The study was guided by three research questions namely: “What are the roles 
that AWF and donors expect villagers to take in the pilot project for REDD at 
Kolo hills?” The second was “To what extent do the villagers agree to and 
comply with the roles assigned to them in the REDD pilot project?” and the third 
was “How do issues of available role compliance can be explained?” The study 
largely employed a qualitative approach as well as some elements of quantitative 
research approach. A sample size of 95 respondents from 11 villages in the Kolo 
Hills as well as some key official from REDD+ project was selected using both 
purposive and non-purposive sampling techniques. The sample had 51 males and 
44 females. The data gathered in this study were transcribed verbatim coded, and 
analyzed qualitatively according to their content, themes and patterns that 
emerged.  
 
I found that there were differences on how the REDD+ pilot project was 
perceived in the Kolo Hills and therefore there were differences in how its roles 
were conformed and taken up by villagers. This study found out different groups 
in the compliance aspect. There were the REDD+-Ready, REDD+-Negative, and 
the REDD+-Ready-but disappointed villagers. The reason behind the varied 
compliance levels is explained by various factors including improper application 
of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), delay of the project-side to fulfill the 
project benefits and promises and so unable to meet villagers’ expectations. Other 
issues such as the negative experience with the past and neighboring conservation 
projects, the failure of the project to come with alternative livelihood sources, as 
well as political influences also explains the situation.  
 
In light of the research findings and conclusions, several recommendations were 
advanced. One of the several recommendations that I advance is that REDD+ 
should emphasize communicating the Project especially on the aim, goals and the 
benefits for more awareness among the villagers who are not willing to comply 
with the ascribed roles so as to create a more understanding of the Project and its 
processes, improve and increase the incentives to villages participating so as to 
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attract their participation, and to find ways of integrating the Government into the 
Project so as to win the villagers’ trust in the Project for their full participation in 
the roles ascribed. Further, it recommends for a designed donor intervention to 
ensure the fulfillment of the promises made during the launching of the project so 
as to maintain the reputation and credibility of the project to villagers.  
 
Moreover, I recommend re-examination of a transparent benefit-sharing 
mechanism especially in the Joint Forest Management (JFM) for an improved 
system that will safeguard the villagers’ interests because they are the ones who 
bear the direct costs of forest management. Lastly, the Project should design a 
gendered program on how to distribute the benefits of the project due to the 
reason that men and women have differently used the forests, and they are also 
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This study was part of the Climate Change Impacts Adaptation and Mitigation 
(CCIAM) Projects in Tanzania that aimed at inquiring into the implication of the 
REDD+ initiative on smallholders’ livelihoods through access to land in Manyara 
Region Tanzania. Specifically, it aimed at pinpointing the opportunities and 
challenges available.  
 
My study aimed at exploring villagers’ roles from AWF’s and the Norwegian 
Government’s perspective, and examining the nature of role compliance at the 
project level in the REDD+ pilot Project in the Kolo Hills, Kondoa. I conducted 
qualitative interviews and documentary analysis to solicit the information.  The 
major findings from the Kolo Hills` case is that villagers were not uniformly 
conforming and complying with the roles ascribed to them by the NGO and the 
donor. The explanation behind this inconsistency in role compliance is explained 
by various factors including the manner in which the Project was delivered, 
ambiguities, goal inconsistency, negative background with the past conservation 
projects, difference in ambitions and interests, and the fact that the Project side is 
yet to fulfill its part. In reality villagers have the power of self-determination and 
so they may decide to or not to conform basing on their own justifications. 
Moreover, the level and nature of conformity is also dependent on how well 
villagers have been oriented to the project roles by the role provider, how 
informed they are, and what benefits they are going to get in their engagement. 
Due to these factors villagers differently conformed to roles in the Kolo Hills 
REDD+ project.  
 
1.1 Background 
The contribution of forests to the life of the communities and the government, and 
as a means for mitigating and adapting to climate change are amongst the 
concerns in the current environmental conservation debates. Despite the supply of 
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wood and non-wood products, forests offer employment, they are a source of 
revenue through sale of wood and non-wood products and services, help in soil 
conservation and serve other human uses. The current global and national 
concerns are expanded to how effectively forests can be managed because they 
are seen as the cheapest way of mitigating climate change through sequestering 
carbon (URT, 2009; UNREDD, 2008). 
 
Nationally, in the Tanzania’s conservation history, the government has been 
protecting and preserving forest as a means of wildlife conservation. The purpose 
of conservation at independence and thereafter was not because of the intrinsic 
value but because of the instrumental value attached to forests: income and 
foreign exchange (Neumann, 1995; 1998).  
 
The approach of conservation after independence was to a large extent a top-
down approach (Neumann, 1998). This nationalistic top-down approach to 
conservation faced a lot of resistance as communities perceived and valued land 
and forests as their means of survival. The majority of rural communities in 
Tanzania depend heavily on forests and forest products as a source of bio-energy 
(firewood and charcoal), medicine, soil protection and agriculture.  This 
dependence on forests and forest products even to-date collides with the 
Government’s goal of conservation (Yanda, 2012). 
 
Deforestation in Tanzania was estimated at 412,000 ha per annum between 1990 
and 2005. The Government holds the main causes of deforestation to be 
population growth, poverty, policy inadequacies and market failure. Furthermore, 
they also point to causes such as agriculture, overgrazing, wildlife, charcoal 
making, wood fuel and lack of efficient production and marketing, over-
exploitation of wood resources, lack of land use plans and lack of adherence to 
existing ones (URT, 2009).  
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Several initiatives have been taken by the Government of Tanzania and non-
governmental actors to improve the management of forests and forest resources. 
These initiatives were partly done because the perception (by professionals and 
academics) about forests has changed from wood production to valuing it for its 
non-wood importance and a range of the environmental and other services that it 
provides (Petersen & Sand hovel 2001). Policies on land and forest management 
were reviewed with the aim of decentralizing forests management and making it 
participatory. The policies provided for the Government as the owner of the land, 
taking care of it on behalf of the people. 
 
Amidst these efforts, deforestation continued to persist until the Reduction of 
Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) Projects came in as a new 
strategy which is not only aimed at addressing deforestation sustainably but also 
carbon sequestration. Tanzania was considered by UN to be one of the countries 
where REDD could be implemented because it is ranked as the fourth among the 
most deforested countries in the world and the available participatory institutional 
framework: Participatory Forest Management (PFM) that is the Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) and Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) seen as 
an entry point to the Project (Faida & Eliamani, 2010).  
  
Tanzania is currently receiving funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs through the Norwegian embassy in Dar es Salaam to implement nine 
REDD pilot projects in specific parts of Tanzania (Burgess et al, 2010). This 
implies that a lot of activities related to forests and reduction of carbon emissions 
are taking place from national to grass-roots levels. With this intervention, I 
wanted to explore the roles of key stakeholders particularly villagers in the pilot 
phase and how at the project level villagers comply with the roles assigned to 
them by project donor and facilitator. 
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Therefore, this study was basically on exploration of roles assigned to villagers, 
and the way villagers comply with the specified roles by the Norwegian 
Government and the African Wild Life Foundation.  
 
1.2 REDD and REDD+ Project in Tanzania 
1.2.1 REDD and REDD+ 
i. REDD  
The acronym stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation. Klepsvik (2012) holds that “REDD is an effort to create financial 
value for the carbon stored in the forests”. The system of payment would involve 
carbon tradeoff, or repaying for forest conservation. REDD strategy is believed to 
be a win-win strategy which not only emphasizes forest conservation (for 
reducing emissions) through land use management for a sustainable forest 
management but it also contributes to poverty reduction in the communities 
participating. Kanchan (2011) holds that, REDD promises to address other social 
and economic aspects such as improvement of alternative livelihood issues, bring 
other profits from the preserved areas, and other ecological services. 
Consequently, REDD is seen as a successful way whereby forest-neighboring 
communities are sustainably managing their forests while benefiting from their 
contribution to CO2 emissions reduction.  
 
Adopted by United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) countries during the 13th Conference of Parties in Bali, Indonesia, 
REDD is expected to contribute to both communities living near the forest 
reserve as well as attaining the goal of forest conservation for the purpose of 
reducing emissions (URT, 2013). As cited from different literatures, REDD is an 
ambitious international climate resolution mechanism that attempts globally to 
reward developing countries. By implementing policies and programs aimed at 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation for the purpose of sustaining and 
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improving forest carbon stocks and sinks. Countries under REDD will be 
compensated. Additionally, REDD brings in place a new strategy of reducing 
CO2 emissions by paying for activities that avoid forest loss or degradation 
(UNREDD, 2009; Kanchan, 2011). 
 
Ximena and Alvarado suggest that climate change is real and its effects are seen 
not only in human life but also in natural entity. Early mitigation is necessary in 
addressing climate change, as it seems to be cheaper compared to addressing its 
future consequences if left unattended. The mitigation strategy that was given 
priority was from afforestation and reforestation simply because forests can act as 
carbon sinks (which also can mitigate climate change). However, later on the 
focus was extended to stress on avoided deforestation where communities 
participating will be compensated (Ximena and Alvarado, 2007). Parallel to this 
thinking, the Tanzania National REDD Strategy affirm that, it was from this 
rationale whereby Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD) was formulated (United Republic of Tanzania, 2013). 
 
As noted by Hufty and Haakenstan (2011) and UN-REDD (2009), deforestation 
share in greenhouse gases emitted sector wise is estimated to be about 17 % of 
the total greenhouse gases emitted globally. However, when managed well forests 
may absorb and store 50% of the organic carbon. If REDD is successful that will 
be the amount of CO2 estimated to be stored. After this success, the countries 
participating in REDD+ will be compensated as they are providing an 
environmental service of reducing CO2.  
 
IPCC (2007) presents the percentage of the green house gases emission from 
different sectors forestry inclusive. In their summary, the energy sector produces 
25.9%, industry 19.4%forestry 17.4%, agriculture 13.5%, transport 13.1%, while 
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residential sector produces 7.9% while waste emits 7.9% of GHG. Figure 1.1 
below is the presentation of emission per sector as adapted from IPCC. 
 
Figure 1.1: Percentage of GHG emissions by industrial sector 
 
     Source: IPCC 2007 
 
From the above depiction, it entails that the emission of carbon dioxide gases 
comes not only from deforestation and forest degradation but highly from the 
daily energy production and consumption behaviors as well as other sectors. 
Since the beginning of industrial revolution (1850s) the increased use of fossil 
fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas has accelerated the global climate 
change despite the fact that the world’s climate has always varied naturally.  
Whenever fossil fuels are burned, a significant amount of Green House Gas 
(GHG) is produced in massive amounts and endures in the atmosphere for a long 
time, which exhausts the Ozone layer than other gases such as Methane, 
Chlorofluorocarbons and Nitrogen oxides. These gases had been stipulated in 





Figure 1.2: Presentation Emission Percentage by Gas Type. 
 
      Source: Source: IPCC, 2007 
 
ii. REDD+ 
Inferring to the discussion by Kanchan (2011), REDD+ was formulated at the 
Conference of Parties 14th (COP 14) of 2008 in Ponzan, Poland and it was further 
discussed in the 15th Conference of Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen, Denmark in 
2009. The Copenhagen Accord was also formed in the COP 15, which among 
other things it recognizes REDD+ as a strategy for reducing CO2 emission from 
deforestation and forest degradation and brought a platform for fund mobilization 
for REDD+. As per UN-REDD (2009) the major focus of REDD+ is not only on 
payments for prevented deforestation and forest degradation but also on other 
activities including stopping forest fires, amendment in logging activities, and 
other activities of forest management.  Kanchan summarizes that, “…it is 
necessary to address and acknowledge the carbon stock enhancement and 
sustainable forest management practices besides activities addressing 
deforestation and forest degradation…” (Kanchan 2011:23). 
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From the UN-REDD portrayal, REDD+ “…goes beyond deforestation and forest 
degradation and include the role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks…” in developing countries 
(Klepsvik ibid p.1).  REDD+ bring both new opportunities and new challenges to 
communities in managing forests. It deals with issues of deforestation and forest 
degradation while putting into consideration local livelihood issues as a way of 
dealing with rural poverty (UN-REDD 2009).      
 
Since adoption of REDD and REDD+ there have been several negotiations by 
member-states regarding on how the REDD mechanism will be implemented. 
Issues of carbon measurement and carbon assessment methodology, payment 
system and many others are under discussion so as to open the way for a better 
future REDD and REDD+. 
 
However, there are many issues to be settled under REDD and REDD+ such as 
issues of payment mechanism, form of funding, how to monitor emissions, how 
to meet local social needs while attaining the goal of reduced emission and the 
baseline for emission level. Negotiations are still in place on how to address some 
of the challenging issues, hopeful through negotiations, actors will reach a state 
where all the basic issues for REDD institutionalization will be settled. 
 
iii. REDD+ Payments 
According to the UNFCCC (2007), it is the responsibility of developed countries 
to incur the monetary expenses in reducing emissions because they are the one 
with bigger shares of carbon emitted compared to the developing countries. In 
2008, developed Nations initiated the post 2012 Carbon Credit Fund amounted 
euro 125 million for REDD+ programmes. A coalition of Developed Nations 
made further promise of disbursing USD 4.5 billion dollars purposely for REDD+ 
activities by 2012. Moreover, the coalition estimated that global financial flows 
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for GHG reductions could reach up to US 30 billion dollars per year (UNREDD 
2009). If fulfilled accordingly, this is an opportunity for developing countries like 
Tanzania to help their rural communities in poverty alleviation. This is because 
communities surrounding the forest are not only vulnerable to climate change 
impacts but they are the one who bear the direct costs of forest management and 
so they should benefit from the fruits of their conservation efforts. 
 
Future REDD+ will highly depend on the funding from the carbon credit. 
However, the carbon credit is highly dependent on the global economic 
conditions. To engender enduring monetary flows for the REDD+ payments after 
the pilot time would be contingent on the reliability of the carbon market, which 
would also depend on the constancy of demand and supply of carbon credits. 
However, the current global financial crisis had also disturbed the demand and 
price of carbon. 
 
Concerning the payment options, UNFCCC countries agreed on two payment 
options concerning the REDD+ payment mechanism namely market and non-
market mechanism. In the market-based mechanism the private sectors in 
developed countries are allowed to buy REDD+ carbon offset credits while in a 
non-market mechanism developing countries are supposed to receive REDD+ 
funding from international multilateral public fund under the UNFCCC basing on 
outcomes or efforts achieved. In this payment type developing country would 
claim funding from the International Multilateral Public Fund for the reduced 
emissions in a certain periods of time in the accomplishment of REDD+ 
activities. This mechanism (non-market) necessitates for the presence of the 
governments of the developing nations to supervise all the activities of REDD+ 
performed by a certain country in a given time (Taccon and Irawan, 2009). 
Tanzania has opted for the second option (non-market mechanism) for her 
REDD+ pilot phase. 
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1.2.2 REDD+ Implementation in Tanzania 
According to various literatures, internationally, REDD implementation in 
Tanzania is rationalized by; Tanzania being amongst tropical countries with big 
forest cover of tropical forests which are good in carbon storage (Burges et al 
2010), availability of a favorable institutional setup that promotes local people 
participation particularly participatory forest management, presence of land 
tenure systems which provides village land under the mandate of villagers 
(Bartholdson et al, 2012; Faida and Eliamani 2010) and lastly, Tanzania is facing 
an increased danger of deforestation and forest degradation rate, which 
necessitates a call for an action (Yanda, 2012). It was behind these major reasons 
that Tanzania was considered qualified for REDD implementation. 
 
Concerning the danger of rapid deforestation and degradation rate, Yanda (2012) 
presents rapid population growth to be the major driver of deforestation in 
Tanzania. Population growth puts pressure on forests as a way of getting biofuel. 
The Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimates that, Tanzania had 
44,928,923 citizens by 2012 (NBS 2012), 90% of whom depend on biofuel as 
their major source of energy. Additionally, 50% of Tanzanians live below the 
poverty line, which makes it difficult for them to meet the costs of substituting 
fuel wood with other sustainable sources like solar energy that are costly. 
Likewise, inadequate technology is among the issues that contribute to 
deforestation (URT 2005).  
 
The REDD+ pilot phase implementation in Tanzania is highly financed by the 
Norwegian Government under special agreement with the Tanzanian 
Government. In 2008 the Government of Norway decided to support pilot 
projects in Tanzania under its International Climate and Forest Initiative (ICFI). 
This support forms the basis for local level capacity building, development of the 
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national REDD strategy and implementation. This support would form the basis 
for future REDD in the country. Furthermore, the partnership was not only based 
on natural resources but in agricultural sector too (Nordeco 2013).  
 
In order to qualify for REDD+ funding, Tanzania was supposed to identify a 
REDD+ task force and establish a country`s REDD+ strategy and program that 
identified institutional issues and coordination of REDD at all levels, awareness 
creation and communication for REDD, local capacity building, and networking. 
The strategy explicitly identified the roles, principles and responsibilities to be 
accomplished by all stakeholders involved in the project until the money is 
channeled. 
 
For illustrations, the Monitoring matters organization (2012) provides for a three-
pronged structure of REDD implementation in Tanzania namely: at the national 
level, international and at the ground level. These operators work together in a 
circle. At the national level, the carbon will be measured, analyzed and verified. 
After the verification process, the international level will disburse the money. The 
money is anticipated to benefit the communities who will spend it according to 
their development priorities. The Ministry of Natural Resources will supervise all 
the activities together with the local authorities for transparency and 
accountability purposes. At the local level, the authorities will do reporting and 
monitoring. They will also send the feedback to the Ministry and later on to the 
International level again. Figure 1.3 summarizes the structure from the Tanzania 





Figure 1.3: Proposed National Structure of REDD+ Implementation in 




According to the Nordeco mid-term review (2013), the implementation of 
REDD+ in Tanzania has reached to its second phase. The first phase commenced 
on March 2009 to April 2011 in which USD 2.4 millions were channeled. Key 
deliverables were: REDD task force establishment, installing REDD pilot 
projects, communicating and awareness creation for REDD+, and the 
development of the national REDD strategy. 
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The second phase of implementation started in October 2011 whereby the amount 
of USD 4.49 millions was directed for the purpose of extending phase one 
outcome, which was highly on support. The time frame for this phase was 24 
months. 
 
However, despite the presence of this partnership the Norwegian government 
through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not pleased to enter into partnership 
with the Tanzanian government concerning direct implementation of the REDD 
pilot phase because of its corruption scandal of the 1990`s until 2006 involving 
Tanzania’s environmental sector. Instead, the Norwegian government decided to 
enter into partnership with the NGOs for implementing nine REDD pilot projects 
in Tanzania as facilitators and not the government. (Bartholdson et al, 2012).  
 
i. REDD+ in the Kolo Hills 
The African Wildlife Foundation entered into partnership with the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for implementation of REDD in the Kolo Hills 
Kondoa district. The Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania called for proposals for 
REDD pilot projects, and AWF qualified to be among those who got the funding. 
AWF was interested in the Kolo Hills because it is along its “heartlands” and so 
conserving it would directly impact the Tarangire River, which is the source of 
water for wildlife in the Tarangire national park. The project is named Advancing 
REDD in the Kolo Hills Forests (ARKFor) in which the main goal is; 
 
“to contribute to the poverty reduction and climate change mitigation 
by enhancing Tanzania`s capacity to use REDD as a mechanism for 
rural communities to reap tangible benefits from improved forest 
management and conservation” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009) 
 
REDD+ pilot project in the Kolo Hills is under facilitation of the AWF for four (4) 
years now since December 2010 until 2013. AWF`s interests in Kolo was based on 
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its aim to secure Tarangire River which is the water source for the wildlife in the 
park. In the study of the Kolo Hills project, Batholdson et al (2012) found that 
56,000 ha of forests in the Kolo Hills are under AWF REDD facilitation. 
 
From the AWF perspective ARKFor Project is designed to address degradation 
through promotion of alternative sources of livelihood, to market and sell carbon 
for the purpose of serving communities and conservation, to encourage proper land 
use management, to build the capacity of REDD stakeholders at the local and 
national level and to share information and networking of improvement of 
conservation issues (AWF, 2012). 
 
From the AWF justifications, previous conservation projects in Kondoa such as 
HADO (Land rehabilitation program in Dodoma Region) were centralized with 
inadequate citizens` participation and so there was less local ownership in these 
projects. REDD+ in the Kolo Hills is said to be participatory and involving local 
stakeholders in its activities and programs. However, on the ground there are 
several issues to be addressed so as to ensure full participation of the villagers in 
the REDD Project. AWF argues that, local people empowerment especially in 
decision making is among the strategy to ensure true participation of villagers in 
REDD project (AWF,op cit). 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study was guided by three research questions namely; 
1. What are the roles that the African Wildlife Foundation and donors expect 
villagers to take in the pilot project for REDD at Kolo Hills? 
2. To what extent the villagers agree and comply with the roles assigned to them 
in the REDD pilot project? 
3. How do issues of role compliance and incompliance can be explained? 
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1.4 Rationale for the study 
Exploration of stakeholders` roles in the REDD pilot project cannot be ignored 
for the aim of gathering valuable information and lessons in the pilot phase. The 
centrality of stakeholders who are directly or indirectly affected by development 
projects has been a global concern. This emphasis is grounded on the theoretical 
underpinning that planning and policy processes are pluralistic in nature and no 
single organization or individual can exert direct control over the destination of 
development process (Jamal & Getz, 1995; Reed, 1997).  
 
Schumacher (1973) argues that development does not start with physical goods 
but with people and their education, organization and discipline, and if it excludes 
the people, all resources will remain latent and untapped potential. He emphasizes 
decentralization in decision-making and the centrality of people (key 
stakeholders) to any kind of development process.  It is from this theoretical 
grounds that I found it convincing to conduct the study on the villagers’ roles 
under REDD and how they perceive and take up the roles. 
 
Furthermore, conducting research on roles in REDD issues became my interest 
following the lecture series at the Center for Development and the Environment 
(SUM) of the University of Oslo. I found knowledge gathering on roles 
accomplished under REDD to be something very important for the future REDD 
Project. In its pilot phase there is a lot to learn and adjust so as to prepare all 
stakeholders for the overall project implementation. Basing on the fact that 
REDD Project is implemented in Tanzania it was easier for me to go and find out 
the roles and compliance in fulfilling the goals of sustainable forest conservation 
on the villagers` side in this pilot project.  
 
Another reason for conducting my study on REDD roles in the Kolo Hills was my 
attachment to the Climate Change Impacts Adaptation and Mitigation (CCIAM) 
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projects as young professional. I had to research from the same case study (Kolo 
Hills), which was targeted by the project. I was involved in this project not only 
as part of the team but also I received the fieldwork support from CCIAM. The 
mega research project in the Kolo Hills was on land issues and livelihoods. 
 
Significantly, soliciting villagers’ roles is essential as it helps in identifying best 
practices and successes stories from what have been done so that they may be 
included in future REDD negotiations and be promoted in implementation of 
other REDD projects after the pilot phase. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
REDD+ should not just be concerned with forests and reduced emission; it should 
be concerned with local people and their surroundings, right to property, 
livelihood and their role in decision making of the issues affecting their wellbeing 
in their respective contexts. This study has provided; on one hand the 
comprehensive analysis of the local communities’ roles as specified by the 
project donor and the facilitator and on another hand the extentto which villagers 
agree and comply with these rolesascribed. This research work has enlighten the 
AWF and the donor on what is real happening on the ground and so to develop an 
action plan to make things right where they are not right. This is specifically on 
the role of citizens who are the primary implementer and beneficiaries of the 
project. 
 
Because it is a pilot period of the REDD+ projects, the findings from this study 
will help the project designers and the government of Tanzania to get a clear 
picture of the communities` readiness towards REDD+ particularly on roles 
identified to them. This clear picture will guide the REDD designers to come up 
with the concrete strategies, policies and laws concerning REDD+, and how well 
it would be implemented. 
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Educationally, this is an important requirement for the fulfillment of the Master 
of Philosophy (Culture Environment and Sustainability) thesis of the University 
of Oslo. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure and Interdisciplinary 
This work is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction 
whereby; REDD and REDD+ concepts were discussed as well as the REDD+ 
project in Tanzania and Kolo Hills. In addition, the rationale to the choice of the 
topic, and the significance of the study were also presented. Lastly, research 
questions, and the limitations to the study followed. 
 
The second chapter is the presentation of theoretical issues, literature review 
regarding people’s role in the conservation field overtime. Local development 
tradition, development aid and the conceptual framework sum-up this chapter. 
 
Research methodology is presented in the third chapter. Specifically, this chapter 
enlightens the reader on the research design and approach, population and 
sampling issues, research instruments for data collection and data analysis 
procedures. 
 
Chapter four and five is the finding presentation and discussion while chapter six 
presents the summary, conclusion and recommendation. 
 
This study took the direction of sociological roles presentation as well as aspects 
of political ecology in explaining how villagers take the roles assigned to them in 
the conservation paradigm. 
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1.7 Limitations and Reflections 
Masters research projects cannot be completely devoid of subjectivities and 
limitations. There have been some conditions under which the research process 
has been underpinned with difficulties and limitations. These include the 
following:  
 
Being a Tanzanian may have affected the objectivity of the whole research 
process, including the data collection and analysis processes. This is because 
researching in my own community would get me immersed into it, at any point in 
time, as a member of the community thereby losing the objective lens of 
perceiving the issues.  However, I tried to remain neutral and objective to the 
reality. 
 
Furthermore, staying in the field over a long period of time could create the 
danger of going native. The researcher, having been staying in the research area 
over a long period, might get her identifying with the people and hence becoming 
sympathetic to the cause of the people. If such occurs, the objectivity of the 
researcher fades.  To ensure this did not affect my research work, I had to keep on 
reflecting on the research purpose, my role as a researcher and its effect to the 
research process. 
 
Also, in some areas, villagers feared their relationship with leaders might be 
strained especially if their responses do not go in favour of their superiors. 
Therefore, for the fear of intimidation in some cases, they were refusing to 
respond by telling the researcher to direct the questions to their leaders. On the 
other hand, respondents might have given incorrect responses in order to satisfy 
the whims and caprices of their superiors. 
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Moreover, in some cases, villagers were hoping that the researcher had the 
authority to punish those in charge of the project for not keeping to their 
promises. Therefore, their responses were skewed towards that direction. In 
situations like this, the researcher did all efforts to explain the purpose of the 
research. 
 
Time constraint was also seen as one factor that affected the process of data 
collection. Having more than 90 interviews was too much to handle within the 
stipulated time. This was also due to my attachment to the CCIAM projects where 
I was supposed to have a long stay in the field by visiting more than 10 villages. 
Striking the required acquaintance with the villagers in order to court their trust 
and confidentiality for the right responses was also affected by the limited time. 
 
Finally, concentrating on a single case for this research was a limiting factor to 
generalizing the findings. Other cases need to be studied and compared in order to 
draw a more generalized inferences about peoples roles and their levels of 















2:  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the first chapter I presented the research questions and the introduction of 
REDD+ project in Tanzania. In this chapter I present the theory that I will apply to 
address the research questions. First I define `role` which is a central concept for 
my study. Then, the literature on villagers` roles in conservation, rural 
development and development aid projects will follow. The presentation in this 
chapter will contribute in answering research questions one and two on REDD+ 
roles and compliance as well as research question three. 
 
2.1 Role Theory 
The term role is subject to different definitions depending on the context, who 
defines it, when and the purpose of the definition. I will begin with presenting a 
few different definitions of role. For example The Encyclopedia Britannica online 
defines role as 
 
“A comprehensive pattern of behavior that is socially recognize, 
providing a means of identifying and placing an individual in 
a society. It also serves as a strategy for coping with recurrent 
situations and dealing with the roles of others”.  
 
Key terms in this definition concerning roles are; patterned behaviors, social 
recognition, role as a source of identity and placement.  
 
On the other side, Christiansen and Baum (1991:857 Referred in Mathiowetz 
1992) define roles as sets of connected behaviors that have some socially agreed 
functions and for which there is an accepted code of norms. This view also 
pinpoint role as linked behaviors. Also, it conveys that, for a role to be performed 
there must be agreements and shared principles regarding how they should be 
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performed. Furthermore, it portrays that, when people in the society perform 
different roles they participate in accomplishing societal goals and objectives.  
Biddle, (1986) apprehend role as a set of connected behaviors, rights and 
obligations as comprehended by actors in a social situation. These behaviors, 
rights and obligations are defined according to the context in ways that seem to be 
meaningful to the people. This also implies that the goals set by them to guide 
behaviors usually correlates to what appeals to them. In the same line Lemay 
(1999) argues that, on daily basis, role comprises conceptualization of behavior 
and rules in a particular context whereby these rules can be judged as positive or 
negative. While Stebbins (1967), deviate from perceiving roles as patterns of 
behaviors simply because behaviors are complex and if they are to form roles 
then there would be varieties or roles but not patterned and shared. Instead, 
Stebbins (op cit) relates roles to rights and obligations that surround a status or 
position. 
 
Biddle (1979) suggests the following key features of roles in the society; roles 
present social arrangement, have an outer (observable) and inner (personal) 
perspective, communicate people as role partners, that role goes hand in hand 
with expectations whereby the other role performers and society at large expects 
the actor to behave in certain ways, that behaviors which come out of the roles 
performed are referred as positive or negative, and that context or environment 
sustain and bound role behavior. That is to say people behave in certain ways 
because they are obliged to do so by the contexts they are in. On the other side, 
Stebbins (1967) offers contexts and settings, presence of others, purpose, role 
identities, expectation interpretation, and behavior influence as the basic 
complexions that roles take. 
 
Focusing the attention into the above definitions by Biddle (1979); (1986), Lemay 
(1999), Christiansen and Baum (1991) Stebbins (1967) and the Encyclopedia 
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Britannica, one can notice that, all definitions associates the role concept with 
specific behaviors that limit role performers, these behaviors assure the 
individuals` status in the society and determines the individuals’ ability to 
associate with other role performers. Also, roles are situated and vary according 
to the contexts. It is this standout that will be referred throughout this study 
whenever the word role is mentioned. 
 
Biddle points the origin of role theory from the works of renowned scholars such 
as Georg Simmel, George Herbert Mead, Ralph Linton and Jacob Mareno. There 
have been further developments from what these scholars founded especially 
from perceiving roles as identified behaviors to involve other issues of status and 
social context. Role theory is best explained in the models of symbolic 
interactionism, functional, structural, organizational, and cognitive role theory. 
Major aspects addressed within the role theory are; “consensus, conformity, role 
conflict and role taking”. These key concepts will be discussed explicitly or 
implicitly as this theory is discussed (Biddle 1986:67).  
 
This study takes Stebbins (1967)’s definition that relates roles to rights and 
obligations that surround a status or position. 
 
2.1.2 Key assumptions of the Role Theory 
The role theory is centered on human beings who are the individual social actors 
to take up roles whether achieved or ascribed. The theory entails and preoccupied 
by clarifying what people do and the reason for doing so, and what they expect 
others to do in relation to available societal values and norms. In reality of life, 
this theory systematically explain and reflect how daily life is organized and how 
actors who are the role performers live their life. In a broad-spectrum, role theory 
deals with how people organize themselves in their daily life, how they perceive 
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themselves and perceived by others (Biddle 1979; 1986). The following are 
specific assumption; 
i. Achieved and Ascribed Roles 
In the society roles may be voluntarily acquired by individuals or imposed by 
external actor outside individuals. When actors voluntarily presumes roles basing 
on their own abilities, skills and strengths they are executing ascribed’ roles 
where as, if people execute roles assigned to them by other people beyond their 
control they are in the process of accomplishing ‘ascribed roles’ (Rodney, 2007). 
When people accept to take roles imposed on them, they calculate what they get 
in return by accomplishing the imposed roles. In cases where expectations are not 
met protest may occur and other things like withdrawal and pretending to take 
part while not, striking or the use of any other means which would express their 
desires. Biddle (1979), (1986) and Lemay (1999) agree with each other that, 
when roles are imposed adaptation is necessary so as to adjust to new changes. 
Stress may be experienced particularly when the changes are imposed rather than 
chosen. 
 
ii. Role and Expectations 
Role performers have expectations of what they get back for their engagement in 
different roles. They are also expected to present certain behaviors to justify their 
status as societal role performers. Role expectations are both on action and 
qualities. This presupposes not only expectations to accomplish and act in a 
certain way but also to live the role qualities. These qualities are embedded in the 
role and so the role performer automatically dresses them in the process of 




iii. Roles as guided by Societal Values, Norms, Demands and Rules  
Individuals take up different positions that are shaped by social norms, demands, 
and rules particularly in achieved type of role performance. These demands and 
rules are expectations that are shared, and the actor performing the role is 
expected to adhere to so as to accomplish the requirement needed to fulfill the 
roles. Some requirements are well defined in the society to position holders but 
others are not well defined. Individuals incur costs to conform to role norms and 
those who violate them face punishment (Lemay 1999). 
 
iv. Role Performance and Conflict 
The way actors interpret and perceive themselves and each other may lead to a 
conflict or harmonious relationship hence affecting role performance. With a 
harmonious, good, peaceful and equal relationship, trust is ensured and so the 
social roles may be performed effectively. It is believed and suggested that people 
agree to information more willingly from the people they trust. Lack of local trust 
can limit the success of various activities even if they were designed for the 
benefit of the people themselves (Biddle, 1986). 
 
For the purpose of this study, the concepts of ascribed and achieved roles will be 
used in addressing the research questions. This is because in most development 
projects most of the roles to be performed by villagers come with the projects; 
this means they are ascribed rather than achieved, as it is not the villagers who sit 
and determine what they really need to perform in order to meet the project goals. 
Villagers, in the process of fulfilling the imposed roles, expect the role provider 
to provide them with certain things as a motivation. Therefore, the success or 
failure of the planned action depends on how far the expectation will be met. 
 
Moreover, when roles are imposed on individuals, they do not necessarily 
conform to the provided code of conduct that guide their roles as there will be 
 25 
few people who may violate them and find their own ways of living and behaving 
both in small and large groups. This variation happens because in most cases a 
role expectation in its outer and inner sides is guided by norms, beliefs and 
preferences that are learned but not necessarily shared but are highly influencing 
individual actors` behavior. 
 
2.2 The Roles of Villagers in Literature on Conservation 
The role of villagers in the conservation field has varied overtime following shifts 
on how nature has been perceived and debated. In all three phases villagers’ roles 
have been imposed by external agencies but not coming from within; meaning 
that, it is not villagers who determined how they would like to interact with 
nature but the authorities responsible for conservation. Therefore, in all stages of 
conservation roles assigned to villagers were ascribed rather than achieved roles.  
 
In the first phase, human beings were perceived as unfriendly to nature and so 
they were put aside and far from reserved and protected areas. This was a fortress 
style of conservation. The second paradigm is a win-win discourse which insists 
on the importance of human involvement in nature conservation following the 
realization of the negative implication resulting from separating human beings 
from other natural entity especially wildlife. It is the second model that dominates 
most of our current nature debates and policies. The third discourse is the critical 
analysis that puts clear the practice of today`s win-win style of nature 
conservation. Human rights activists and local/indigenous people immediately 
bordering the protected areas support this (Adams and Mulligan, 2003; 
Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Jones, 2006). A detailed description of people`s 
roles in all the paradigms is discussed below. 
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2.2.1 Fortress Conservation 
In the fortress style of conservation villagers were ignored and mistreated. They 
did not have specific roles. This conservation style dominated from the end of 
19thcentury during park establishment, protected areas were untouched and 
protected by the army, and seen to be a wilderness in which human disturbances 
were not allowed. The literature portrays the centralization of all the key roles and 
decisions concerning conservation under the state authorities and big NGOs. 
These were same actors that supported this view of conservation (Benjaminsen 
and Svarstad, 2010).  
 
Jones (2006:184) for example elucidates that in this era nature was seen as 
untouchable wilderness that is independent from humans, and the state controlled 
and managed the environment by eliminating human interactions nearby reserved 
areas because “the local people were seen as threats to forests and wild life”. This 
model of conservation has been known as ‘protectionism’, ‘fortress conservation’ 
and ‘the fences and fines approach’ to nature. Many conservation plans and 
policies at this time were seen as top-down. 
 
Benjaminsen and Svarstad (op cit) in the discussion of conservation practices 
they provide Yellowstone Park under the best example of the national park that 
was established during the 19thcentury under the fortress style. They argue that 
indigenous people were expelled from their areas to leave the park. Only tourism 
activities were allowed for those who would afford to pay, and these were white 
and rich people.  
 
In addition to the fortress debate, Adams and Hutton (2007:148) reveal that, since 
colonialism there has been a problem of people displacement during the creation 
of protected areas which has been documented overtime since the first 
establishment of parks in the 19th century and further expansions (during 
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conservation boom) in Africa. Disregarding people`s role and participation in 
nature made different scholars and other actors ask questions like; “for whom 
protected areas are put aside? On whose authority and at whose costs?”. These 
questions resulted into a shift to the second nature conservation style that aims at 
integrating humans into processes of conservation. 
2.2.2 Win-win Conservation Style 
Through a win-win conservation style villagers are assigned roles, and are 
supposed to take part in conservation and become partners. It is a form of 
ascribed role type. In return villagers expect benefits in both economic and social 
terms. As discussed by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010), a win-win juncture 
came in the late 1980`s with emphasis on participation of people who live in and 
nearby the protected areas, benefit sharing and compensating local people in case 
they are affected by conservation programmes specifically in protected areas 
establishment. The win-win discourse was a result of the Brundtland report of 
1987concerning the common future, pressure from different actors such as right 
activists, influences of the decentralization wind world-wide, and neo-liberalism 
influences.  
 
Both Adams and Hutton (2007) and Jones (2006) argue in the same line that, 
historically, the recognition of social impacts of protected areas on the 
surrounding population was extensively begun in the 1970’s (as a result of a shift 
to the second paradigm in nature conservation). The motive behind was still to 
have conservation programmes that are more inclusive and participatory both in 
economic and social terms. 
 
In this paradigm there has been theoretical emphasis on a greater resilience of 
African environment and for rural people to interact with nature constructively.  
In the same way, there have been concerns of involving local people in taking 
part in the day-to-day conservations under the available local institutional set-up 
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although the nature of participation practice is also questionable. It is during this 
time when the attention is shifted to a more participatory and community oriented 
conservation, emphasizing the validity of indigenous’ knowledge likewise to that 
of experts, indigenous rights to ecological resources, and benefit redistribution in 
a more equitable way (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010). 
As Neuman (2009) provides, the centrality of people and their involvement in 
nature conservation becomes a topic of interest and importance because 
ecological predicaments are linked to social issues surrounding conservation and 
so they needed not only technical grounds but also a theoretical base to examine 
socio-economic and political relations so as to be able to comprehend well their 
complexities.  
 
As examined by Adam and Hutton (2007) and Walker (2005), the manner in 
which people relate to nature specifically in the framework of protected areas is 
political in nature as it involves issues of resource distribution and access, state’s 
responsibility, and other intellectual power in understanding nature. Also the way 
nature is understood has political significance since it deals with who gets what, 
when, where, and how’.  Therefore, people should be given the central role on 
determining how well nature should be well conserved and benefits from what 
comes out of nature.  
 
There were different efforts made which discouraged bypassing humans in nature 
conservation. For example, in the 1980s, the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature general assembly issued a decree emphasizing on people inclusion and 
protection of traditional life and heritage telling all the governments to stop 
displacing people under the reason of protected areas creation. Further 
advancements were made in 1984 when the World Bank announced further 
guidelines on which barred relocation of local people from their native areas. As 
the result, by 1980’s many conservation models and policies begun to 
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accommodate social needs of indigenous people and so ‘it facilitated a shift from 
social exclusion to social inclusion’. 
 
Moreover, the issue of local/indigenous people role as right recipients is one of 
the key focuses in this discourse. For a long time they were bypassed by 
conservation plans, and programs of their respective areas. These concerns began 
in the 1980’s in Australia and Canada where issues of indigenous “land title and 
resource rights” in conservation were brought in the debate and later on they 
spread all over the world (Adams and Hutton opcit). There was a call to put 
human beings as partners in conservation so as it would be possible to observe 
their rights.  
 
Other conventions on indigenous rights are found in the ILO Convention Number 
169 Article 26, which calls member state to protect and recognize the rights to the 
land, territories, and other resources owned, occupied, used or acquired 
traditionally by indigenous/local people. This means that, in any project initiated 
local people`s role should be central in determining how it should be 
implemented, their benefits and other important issue as they have the right to 
their resources, land, and traditional inheritance (ILO 1991). 
 
Apart from those conventions there have been live events to discuss issues of 
local people rights in nature conservation. One of the cited occasions is the World 
Parks Congress of 2003 in Durban whereby 120 indigenous people, NGOs and 
other key environmental actors attended.  Specific theme of the congress was on 
local people’s rights, equity in relation to protected areas. The outcome of this 
conference was realization and provision of the observance of the rights of both 
mobile indigenous people and local communities in natural resource and 
biodiversity conservation (World Conservation Union 2005 cited by Adams and 
Hutton 2007). Further achievements have been witnessed in the recent 2008 
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United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Indigenous People that explicitly 
provides how the local people should be approached when asking them to take 
part into projects and before relocating them. 
 
Incidences of dispersing local people’s roles in conservation without considering 
their rights has brought impacts to their livelihood hence impoverishment, and the 
violation of the right to own property and other freedoms. It is a call to all actors 
to change their perception from perceiving human as destructors of nature and 
believe that human has equal value and they are part of nature. This approach is 
believed as one of the best ways to avoid coercion to local people (Walker, 2005). 
 
i. A win-win Style Associated with Sustainable Resource use 
Concerns for sustainable resource use came in the 1990`s as a way of meeting 
both the human needs as well as the goal of sustainable environmental 
conservation. In this human`s role was supposed to be that of nature extraction 
while considering the needs of the future generation. These ideas replaced the 
destruction approach to nature (Hulme and Murphree, 2001). It is believed that, 
sustainable development would be achieved when conservation is accompanied 
by sustainable resource use of living entity and ecosystems.  
 
Propagators of ‘sustainable use’ believe that,  
 
“it is only when the indigenous people are given direct economic part, 
interests and benefits to the species protected the sustainable conservation 
and development can be achieved. It is when their livelihood is secured 
the conservation process would succeed” (Adams and Hutton 2007:151).  
 
The idea of sustainable use became a key reason for funding in conservation 
arena during 1990’s by several development agents including the USAID. It is 
still taken as a condition for financing even to date. 
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Moreover, through sustainable use, local people can still use resources such as 
timber, medicinal products, bee production, vegetable, fruits, firewood, poles, 
thatching grasses, and other available stuffs for their wellbeing as agreed in the 
village meetings.  
 
ii. A Win-Win Conservation and Poverty Reduction 
Apart from just pushing the changing of roles of local people from destructors to 
partner of nature, stakeholders have also put in place aspects of poverty reduction 
as something which should go hand in hand with local people involvement in 
nature conservation. Poverty reduction is being mainstreamed in conservation 
through a win-win strategy. It is proposed that, a win-win strategy should be put 
in conservation plans and actions so as to attain the goal of poverty reduction 
while achieving another goal of environment sustainability. Poverty reduction and 
conservation should go simultaneously.  
 
As a way of handling conservation and poverty reduction in a simultaneously 
way, the aspect of Payment for Ecological Services (PES) and other income 
generating activities are now emphasized. One of the best ways to PES is tourism 
in which people pay so as to access the well-protected nature for the purpose of 
generating income and employment to locals. However, not all the local people 
can afford to pay the fees for accessing reserves but also there have been reported 
cases of inequitable distribution of the PES benefits hence local dissatisfactions.  
 
For the past three decades conservation projects has created the so-called 
conservation sufferers and evacuee by extending the poverty level among the 
neighboring communities. Adams and Hutton in their discussion of people, park 
and poverty found that, conservation projects have created burden and more pains 
to the locals other than what it was expected to bring, it has 
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created“...landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, economic marginalization, 
food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common 
property services and social disarticulation…” (Adam and Hutton 2007:164). 
They add that, “…biodiversity conservation should reduce poverty…help 
alleviate hunger and poverty, promote good human health and be the basis for 
ensuring freedom and equity for all”. They advocate for a new approach to 
protected areas that will prioritize local people`s role and accommodate local 
people’s needs so as to help to alleviate poverty. This is due to the rationale that 
protected areas save as the source of livelihood to the poor. 
 
A number of criticisms have been directed against this approach basically on the 
side of the actual benefits, benefit distribution, and the institutional set up of park 
administration which not only marginalize the people but also it does not directly 
include the local populations. The following are views of different scholars in 
regard to criticisms; 
 
The first critique is from Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010:385) in their analysis 
of conservation discourses in competition with practices in Africa. They depict 
that instead of devolving the powers and responsibilities to the locals in Tanzania, 
current conservation practices by both NGOs and state authorities has resulted 
into `recentralization´ and “economic marginalization instead of poverty 
reduction” because the benefits they get form the protected areas is less than the 
cost they normally incur. In most cases leaders and elites are not willing to 
decentralize everything concerning natural resource especially when they find 
that they have stake in the issue at place. 
 
In addition, Jones (2006) and Adams and Hutton (2007) puts clear that despite the 
fact that those who bear the costs of conservation in the protected areas are locals, 
there have been reported cases of low benefits accrued from the schemes. 
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Moreover, there has been a reported inequity in distribution whereas local elites 
have more benefits than others in most instances. Corruption conducts are also 
coming in especially from unethical staffs when people seek for permits to access 
those products. Therefore, it is still debatable whether the win-win style of 
conservation would really help in poverty reduction of the nearby communities in 
the protected areas. 
 
Paradoxically, in most of the countries to date there are places where incidents of 
obligatory local people displacement, removals and injustice are happening 
despite all the efforts advocating for the observance of the rights of the 
indigenous people and reducing poverty. Needs, rights, and interests of the people 
are bypassed to the extent that parks and all the species protected are more worthy 
than human beings surrounding the protected areas. Under this situation it is 
paradoxical how this type of conservation that bypasses the locals would result 
into poverty reduction. Jones confers the following for a successful conservation; 
 
“…Global and local are clearly intertwined, unless local values are 
accommodated, international values and goals will be subverted by 
local responses…tensions (will) continue to exist, given that local 
incentives indicate devolution of proprietorship, while the 
international-level bureaucratic and technocratic mind upholds the 
centralization of authority and regards devolution as the surrendering 
of professional management to unsophisticated peasants” (Jones 
2006:491). 
 
In the light of above discussion, it is well defined that, conservation authorities 
have mostly determined villagers’ roles in conservation. This entails for ascribed 
roles in conservation rather than achieved roles (in which roles originates from 
within villagers). In the fortress style, although there was nothing specific done 
by villagers, they were ordered to stay aside the reserves. It was not their will to 
be away but all the regulations about their interactions with protected areas came 
from central organs. On the side of a win-win style, it is said and believed that 
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there is more participation of villagers in decision making of issues related to the 
conservation of the neighboring areas. However, the question that remains is who 
determines the roles and how the benefit will be shared. On roles, it is not 
ordinary villagers who decide what to do but the central nature protection 
authorities. Therefore, it is correct to term villagers’ roles in all the phases as 
more ascribed rather than achieved.  
 
2.3 Forest Conservation in Tanzania 
The Tanzania Forest Act (2002) explicitly provides for four types of forests in 
Tanzania: National Forest Reserves under the central government, Local 
Authority Forest Reserves under the local government, Village Forests Reserves 
managed and owned by villagers, and Private Forests that are owned and 
managed by one or more individuals under traditional rights of tenure and forests 
located in general land of which the rights are given to individuals, groups, or 
corporates. Following the problem of degradation and deforestation, fundamental 
efforts are made so as to conserve them.  
 
Zahabu shows that, the forest sector in Tanzania is presently facing a crisis highly 
triggered by the biofuel extraction and other livelihood generation activities that 
are directly or indirectly related to forests.  It is estimated that 412,200ha of 
forests were lost annually in 1990 to 2000s. It is from this alarming danger that 
both local and global attention to conserve and save these degraded and 
deforested forests was/is encouraged (Zahabu, 2008 in Yanda, 2012).  
 
Generally, forest conservation in Tanzania is not a new phenomenon as it can be 
dated back from colonial administration in Tanganyika: both in German and 
British rule in areas like Tanga Region. The manner in which conservation was 
applied was coercive in nature and it (conservation) was highly affected by 
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plantation (commercial) agriculture that needed more land expansion to meet the 
demand for raw materials (Hamilton and Bensted, 1989 in Vihemäki, 2005).   
 
After the colonial era conservation of forests was done to get instrumental value 
out of forests: as a way of getting timber and protection purposes (for example 
preservation of water catchment and control of soil erosion). Forest management 
institutions at this time were highly centralized and created a protectionist and 
fortress approach to nature. This centralized management resulted into more 
forest destruction by some officers at the local level who were very corrupt and 
they needed money from timber extraction licensing. Many officers have 
enriched themselves from government forest products. One of the deforested 
forests due to corrupt leaders was Shengena and Amani Nature Reserve, to 
mention but a few (Vihemäki, 2005).  
 
Post-colonial time witnessed massive commitment of trans-national players in the 
management of forests partly as a way of building local capacity and technical 
assistance on forestry for commerce, and later on for conservation. As an 
example, the involvement of the Finnish Development Cooperation (FDC) in the 
Eastern Usambara Mountain supported timber extraction inventories and later on 
moved on to conservation purposes.  Other conservation projects were introduced 
in other areas too (Vihemäki, ibid).  
 
Presently, there has been a continued call to pay more attention to the forestry 
sector as well as mainstreaming policies that promote environmental conservation 
including forestry sector alteration. This emphasis results from the observed 
increasing rates of degradation and deforestation in the Tanzanian forestry sector 
as well as the value of the tropical forests in sequestering carbon dioxide: as one 
of the ways of adapting and mitigating to climate change.   
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The Tanzania Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2009) argues that, the 
phenomenon of deforestation is evident in both reserved and unreserved land. In 
order to minimize this problem, the Government of Tanzania decided to force 
villagers to reduce pressure on forests from charcoal making, firewood and timber 
extraction, building poles by centralizing the processes for them to get those 
mentioned services. For instance it was provided that charcoal and timber 
extraction would only be allowed by having a special permit from the authorities. 
 
Moreover, for more improved forests the Government agreed to take part in the 
REDD process which aims at addressing deforestation as one way of responding 
to climate change. It is believed that with REDD villagers living adjacent to forest 
reserves will benefit from carbon credit as the result of reduced pressure on the 
forest areas hence improvement in the forest cover and afforestation. How the 
whole process is measured, analyzed, reported and verified, is still in the process 
of negotiation.  
 
2.4 A Preview on Local People in Rural Development Tradition 
According to Green (2003), people in the local settings have their own ways of 
living, doing things, and even standards of what fits them and what do not. When 
something new in terms of an intervention or project comes to them; before 
accepting it and participating in its activities they make careful economic and 
social calculations to see how they will benefit from it. If they are clear that they 
would not benefit from the projects individually, and in that case they have no 
sense of ownership of those projects then they start withdrawing. This withdrawal 
may be passive or active withdrawal depending on the nature of the project. 
 
Facilitating development to the rural people should begin with the local people 
themselves who must be the ones to first identify the needs or problems of their 
communities, discuss them formally and informally with one another according to 
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their modalities of discussing their key issues in that particular community. 
However, this has not always been the case with many NGOs, not only in 
Tanzania but also everywhere where NGOs are found. These agencies have their 
own rules, and ways of doings things. They have their rules, objectives, visions 
and missions that in the long run have to be met.  Sometimes they are under the 
pressure of delivering certain deliverables to their donor and so they skip some of 
the key issues. For instance, the structures of development workshops, which are 
always held in high-class hotels located far from the site of the projects, do 
change the idea behind the logic of participation. In this case the representatives 
of villagers and ordinary villagers have less importance to play in arguing against 
what will be reached as the decision in those workshops because partly they are in 
an extraordinary atmosphere but also they might not see it right to challenge the 
financiers. However, they also benefit from these workshops individually through 
allowances and other resources. In these workshops power relations are 
recognizable (Green, 2003).  
 
When facilitating the implementation of development projects in different areas, 
Donors, NGOs and the Government use participation, empowerment and 
sustainable development as their development policy. In most cases these projects 
are designed/ originated from the top and so they are brought to the local people 
to get approval and so to be implemented. This methodology ignores what the 
people really need and what they do not need. 
 
In their discussion about development, and particularly participatory 
development, Cooke and Kothari (2001) suggest that the relations between 
beneficiaries (who most of the time are local people) and facilitators (donors, 
academics, NGOs and leaders) have in most cases have unequal statuses. They 
present the nature of relation existing as tyrannical in nature. Cooke and Kothari 
 38 
(ibid) identify three types of tyranny: tyranny of decision-making and control, of 
group, and tyranny of method.  
 
The tyranny of decision-making and control assumes that there is dominance of 
financial agencies and funders who dominate existing legitimate decision-making 
processes under the rhetoric of participation. The second tyranny is whereby 
decisions taken in a group reinforce the interests of an already powerful group, 
and the last tyranny that advances the method addresses dominance of experts’ 
methods over other relevant and useful methods, which may be found in the 
people in a respective locality. With these tyrannies the process of achieving 
sustainable development cannot easily be attained as it is seen to have no level 
field where all actors are freely interacting. 
 
Many discussions about failure and unsuccessful strategies to development 
support the point that these strategies lack an important input from the real actors 
who are the people or beneficiaries. The argument is that what has always been 
there is the assumption that correct ideas come from the development experts. 
The development experts always treat the local people as passive subjects. So 
long as they are passive, they have always been seen as obstacles to their own 
development. To bring about development, these experts strive to weaken what 
they call people’s conservativeness (Lender, 2003).  
 
Cooke and Kothari (op cit) challenge today’s development practice arguing that, 
while it was supposed for all parties to learn from each other through 
participatory learning, it is the people at the local level who acquire new planning 
knowledge and learn how to apply it rather than professionals to acquire local 
perspectives. This is because most of the time field workers are constrained by 
organizational systems and procedures which need them to deliver certain 
deliverables at certain duration. They argue that for projects to yield good results, 
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the two kinds of knowledge need to be incorporated in the course of planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation as local needs are socially constructed 
and are shaped by local perceptions and so any strategy to development should 
reflect local experiences.  
 
What is obvious in development practices currently is the conflict between 
experts and local knowledge, the former claiming to be more superior. This is 
actually a new form of domination. Enforcing people to accept expert knowledge 
that is actually foreign to them is what Hobbart (1993) calls “growth of 
Ignorance”. In the course of development it is expected to have at least an equal 
relation and recognition of local people as partners and key stakeholders in 
development and so their knowledge to be seen as crucial as the experts’ 
knowledge. 
 
The paradox is, while the number of NGOs and donor funded programmes and 
projects is scaling up, most of the development projects are also not efficient, 
successful, and sustainable hence people’s living standards in the rural areas are 
slackening. Two major problems are identified by Vihemäki (2005) with regard 
to challenges accelerating this problem; firstly local people are perceived as 
project beneficiaries and not key actors with decision-making powers to influence 
decisions affecting the day-to-day development operations and also perceiving 
local people and local situation to be homogenous without recognizing the 
heterogeneity in terms of gender, age, sex, political affiliations, farmer and non-
farmer groups, caste, and many other diversities. 
 
To sum up this part, it is reasonable to argue that, development agents when 
facilitating rural development come with their roles and the methods for 
implementing the assigned roles. These methods ignore the local ones which 
would be used instead and provide positive results. They also ignore the 
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traditional local knowledge that is an important input for rural development. 
Ignoring local methods and knowledge may act as an obstacle to development 
because local people possess an adequate experience with their own environment 
and so they are well acquainted with how to master it.  
 
Furthermore, because development agents and donors mostly determine the roles 
and decisions under rural development, it is likely for the people to promote and 
preserve the interests of donors and facilitators rather than local people’s 
interests. There are areas where conditions have been sanctioned to the local 
people for them to qualify for certain projects. For instance for the REDD Project 
process to be funded, the Government of Tanzania was supposed to meet certain 
requirements including preparation of a strategy, workforce and other key 
requirements which meet donors’ interests for the money to be channeled to 
villagers and NGOs implementing REDD. 
 
2.5 Development Aid in Africa 
Within the development aid context, we have on the one side those countries that 
provide development aid to the poor. They have power to assign roles on others. 
The powerless do not have the power to say no to the roles imposed on them. 
They may have to pretend to be implementing something they would not want to 
do but just accept because they want to impress the donor. They may be 
evidenced in situations in which most projects became unsustainable especially 
after the donor funding and people returned to their business as usual scenarios.  
A good example of this is the land rehabilitation program in Dodoma (HADO) 
during the 1990’s. The program was financed by the Swedish Development 
Cooperation Agency, but the villagers went back to their daily life practices soon 
after the funding ended. 
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Much literature deals with ineffectiveness of development aid channeled to 
Africa. Andrew (2009) suggests that this failure is explained by both internal 
(within the recipient state) and external (global economic system) factors. 
Externally, development aid depends on the pledges made by the donor states that 
are also affected by the economic systems of those states. For the aid to be 
delivered the pledges need to be fulfilled. Internally, the success or failure of the 
development aid projects will depend highly on the context and socio-economic 
and political environment of the recipient country. Issues of leadership, reduced 
corruption, and policies in place, are the things that will determine the success of 
a project. In most African states the environment is not conducive for aid directed 
to them to function well. Issues of mismanagement of funds and corruption have 
been a hindrance to the successful implementation of projects. 
 
Various scholars such as Ferguson and Lohmann (1994), Andrew (2009) and 
Landes (2000), suggest that there must be a consideration of social-cultural 
contexts of the recipient country as an important requirement for aid 
effectiveness. Landes (2000), for example, suggests that consideration of issues 
like local values, and attitudes as either initiators or impediments to the progress 
and so they need to be highly considered when channeling any development aid 
to the recipient country. He further argues that, donor agents and states have not 
made deliberate and affirmative efforts to comprehend the settings within which 
aid can be made to work and become effective (Landre, ibid).  Thinking in the 
same way, Andrew (2009:13) asserts that “for the aid to work well it pays to 
acquire an understanding of the local culture before applying an interventionist 
paradigm because development efforts must be situated within the cultural 
context”.  
 
Additionally, Ferguson (1994:1) in his study of Lesotho argues that “development 
agencies opt for standardized development packages” with little consideration of 
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local social realities. This leads to failure of projects to achieve the predefined 
goals and hence produce unintended objectives like that of Lesotho where instead 
of helping the poor people it expanded the bureaucratic state power. Therefore, all 
these scholars emphasize focus on the context in which aid is channeled so as to 
attain efficiency and effectiveness of development aid projects. 
 
When inference is made to REDD+, there is a need to ask the extent to which the 
designers of the Project ensure that villagers accept and comply with roles 
assigned to them now and after the donor funding. Also the way these roles are 
ascribed to villagers in the Kolo Hills has created confusion and frustrations and 
so most of the villagers seem to be in a position where they find themselves 
disappointed by the process. It is true that the donor and the project facilitator 
lack the power to make things happen the way they wish. It is until they address 
all the confusions and meet the expectations already created in the minds of the 
villagers the future REDD will be fruitful.  
 
Villagers are also wondering how they would benefit after implementing those 
roles assigned to them in a situation where corruption is seen in the already 
accumulated project money from fines and other penalties. There have been 
reported incidences of REDD-fund mismanagement and corruption. According to 
Aftenposten, a daily newspaper in Norway (Referred in REDD-Monitor, 2013), 
in this pilot phase of REDD implementation, there have been cases of fund 
mismanagement and corruption in the REDD projects facilitated by AWF (which 
is facilitating the Kolo Hills) and the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania 
(WCST) which is yet to be settled.  
 
2.6 Research Gap 
The literature reviewed in the previous sections has indicated clearly the 
importance of integrating the local people in the issues affecting their lives. The 
 43 
roles they take and how they take them, is of importance in ensuring the 
attainment of a project’s goals. Despite the fact that the reviewed studies showed 
the centrality of people’s roles, the REDD and REDD+ Project literature has little 
to tell about what roles were ascribed to villagers in the REDD Project and how 
people take the ascribed roles. It is from this background that I had to embark on 
the study.  
 
This study was carried out to fill in the research gap on the roles ascribed to 
villagers in the REDD+ Project and how they comply with the ascribed roles. 
!
2.7 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 2.1 presents the conceptual map through which conformity and 
compliance towards which roles ascribed to villagers can be analyzed. According 
to the framework displays, the donor, government, and NGOs ascribe roles to be 
performed by villagers. When ascribing their roles, there are promises they make 
to villagers on what they should expect as a result of their participation. These 
promises may be financial or non-financial depending on the context.   
 
Moreover, donors, governments, and NGOs inherently possess economic powers 
and influence that in one way convince villagers to take over the roles.  
 
On the other way, villagers create expectations out of the promises made by the 
development agencies ascribing the roles. They (villagers) also calculate the 
socio-economic benefits as well as the implications for them to take part in the 
ascribed roles by the role provider. These calculations are the ones that may lead 
them to willingly take up the roles or resist the roles. 
 
From the local people’s perspective it is the result of the calculations and 
expectations that determine their conformity and compliance. According to Green 
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(2003), when the local people feel that they are bypassedor at least not fully 
involved and they do not benefit from the Project in place they withdraw. Other 
determinants of their full compliance and conformity would be access and rights 
over resource use, the extent to which the project fulfills the promises it made, 
and the way the respective roles are communicated to villagers. 
 
With full role compliance, where villagers feel highly self-esteemed, the overall 
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3:  METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
This chapter presents the research approach and design, describes the study area, 
the sampling procedures, and data sources. It then presents data collection and 
analysis methods.  
 
The study is mainly qualitative in design although it also includes a few 
quantitative aspects. The use of qualitative methodology is engendered by its 
capacity to explore and describe the complexities of social reality and their social 
construction (Mason, 2002). Concepts such as role perceptions, motives behind 
taking or not taking roles under REDD+ are measured and perceived differently 
by people who experience them, and so they are socially constructed and thus the 
reality about them is complex. Therefore, studying them requires methods that go 
beyond what is observed.  
 
3.1 Research Approach and Design 
A research design provides for an organised arrangement and strategies of 
investigation or inquiry for gathering data so as to answer the research questions 
(Kothari, 1990). An exploratory research design was employed. This made the 
researcher capable of discovering new insights about the topic in question. A case 
study strategy was applied whereby the pilot REDD Project in Kolo Hills was 
studied intensively.  
 
A case study design was applied because it permits the researcher to get not only 
a detailed and intensive view of a social phenomenon but also its flexibility and 
reliability (Fidel, 1984). This is because a case study entangles an analysis of the 
features of a single unit so as to deeply probe the diverse singularities that 
compose the existence of that unit with a view of generalization about the entire 
population to which that unit belongs (Cohen et al, 2000). 
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3.2 Study Area and Case Selection 
The study was carried out in Kondoa District at the Kolo Hills forest area in 
Dodoma Region, Tanzania. The study area was selected because it is one of the 
areas implementing the Norwegian funded REDD+Pilot Projects in Tanzania. 
AWF (2012) identifies this area to be one of the highly degraded areas in 
Tanzania despite previous efforts made by SIDA and the Government of 
Tanzania to make it regenerate and achieve sustainable management and 
conservation. According to the national census in Tanzania, the population of 
Kondoa District was 429,824 people in 2002 (URT 2006). AWF (2012) describes 
the major economic activities in this area as consisting of peasant farming, 
whereby crops such as maize, sorghum, beans, finger millet, and pigeon peas are 
grown, and there are livestock keeping and other non-farm activities.  
 
The Kolo Hills Project case was selected partly because I wanted to conduct my 
fieldwork in one of the REDD Pilot Projects in Tanzania. This idea came out of 
the impression that I got from the climate change lecture sessions during the first 
year of my master programme at the University of Oslo.  In addition, I got an 
opportunity to work with the team of CCIAM researchers whose case of inquiry 
was the Kolo Hills too.  
 
3.3 Population of the Study 
The study population was villages in Kondoa District, and particularly those 
within and surrounding the REDD Pilot Project. Other stakeholders of Advancing 
REDD in the Kolo Hills Forest (ARKFor)Project such as facilitators, and local 
government officials were included because they are the main determinants of the 
project direction in terms of finance and technical issues.  
 
The villages implementing the REDD Project and those surrounding are 
presented in the map of the Kolo Hills in Figure (Map) 3.1.   
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Map 2: ArkFor Project Villages and the neighboring villages 
!
Source: The University of Dar es Salaam Institute of Resource Assessment 2013 
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3.4 Sampling Processes and Methods 
Simple random and purposive sampling methods were employed so as to get the 
study sample. Purposive sampling was applied in selecting the study area, 
population, and the project to be studied. The rationale behind the application of 
purposive sampling to get the study area, population and the project to be studied 
was because the number of pilot projects currently being implemented in 
Tanzania is nine only and of these nine projects, some of them were still in their 
initial stage, and others were already under study by many other researchers.  
 
Another reason for purposive sampling of the study area was my intention to 
study one of the Norwegian funded REDD+Pilot Projects in Tanzania, and the 
choice of the Kolo Hills came out of my attachment to one of the CCIAM 
Projects in Tanzania, which necessitated me to do my research in the Kolo Hills. 
 
Other literal justifications for application of a purposive sampling is found in 
Devers and Frankel (2000:264) who suggests that, we go for “information rich 
cases………that is people with greatest insight into the research question”.  
 
Simple random (lottery method) sampling was used to get 11 sampled villages 
(for those under Joint Forest Management (JFM), Community Based Forest 
Management (CBFM), and the villages neighboring the villages implementing 
REDD). This was done so as to provide equal opportunity for each village to 
appear in the sample and hence to assure representation. 
 
The sampling of the research subjects/respondents was done using both purposive 
and random sampling techniques. Simple random (lottery method) sampling was 
employed in the selection of 81 villagers for Individual Interviews from the 
sampled 11 villages. This was done randomly so as to improve representation so 
as to reduce bias in findings. Interviews were conducted with the adults aging 
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between 18 and 70 because they are key participants in village affairs, but they 
are also well informed of the conservation issues overtime. Adding up, purposive 
sampling method was used so as to get important information from the local 
government (that is from the village and district officials), informant from the 
Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and the AWF Project 
Coordinator.  
 
To ensure that the sample is representative, respondents in this research were of 
different attributes, with a view to ensuring that different categories were 
accommodated in the sample. Issues of age, gender, and forest management type 
were considered. The sample consisted of 44 females and 51males. 
 
3.5 Sample Size 
Devers and Frankel (2000) suggest for the sampling process to be guided by ‘a 
sampling frame’ (which provides for criteria for selection of respondents) and the 
framework securing the respondents’ involvement in the study so as to make the 
research successful. In addition, Ary et al (1992) puts clearly that the sample size 
should put into consideration matters of accessibility of the population, 
techniques, time, and resources to undertake a satisfactory study. Besides, as 
provided by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007:242), “the sample size should not be 
too large as it may be difficult in sorting and reading data but also it should not be 
too small because it will limit the issue of representation”. 
 
A total of 95 respondents were involved in this study; 14 in focus group 
interviews and 81 in in-depth individual interviews. The sample distribution was 
as follows; 80 villagers, one official from the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es 
Salaam, two officials at the district level, one local government leader in each of 
the 11 villages, making a total of 11 village leaders, and one NGO representative. 
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3.6 Biographical Features of the Respondents 
Before presenting the findings, it was necessary to present the respondents’ 
biographical features. The rationale behind is because there is faith in the 
assumption that research findings are highly shaped by the biographical features 
of the respondents. The respondents in this research were of different features to 
ensure that different categories were accommodated in the sample. Issues of age, 
gender, and forest management type were considered. 
 
From the table below, I sampled 11 villages from both CBFM and JFM forest 
management type as well as the villages surrounding the villages under the 
project. The total respondents were 95; whereas, 91 were villagers from all the 
four cases, and four were project personnel from the NGO, the government and 
the Norwegian Embassy. 
 
The gender composition of the sample was 51 males and 44 females. The reason 
for this difference is that, in some cases some few women were busy with their 
household chores so they could not make it for the in-depth interviews. Moreover, 
the large number of the sampled respondents was peasants whose daily livelihood 
sources were highly dependent on small-scale farming.  
 
The eligible respondents for the interview were men and women adults aged 18 - 
70 years who mostly take part to community work in the villages in Tanzania. 
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Source: Fieldwork, 2012. 
 
3.7 Instruments of Data Collection 
The use of different methods (triangulation) in data collection is suggested for the 
validation of the instruments and ‘confirmation purposes’ because the weakness 
of one method is supplemented by the strengths of another method (Hussein, 
2009). The literature suggests that there is no self-satisfying method since there is 
a great possibility of distorting the reality of what the researcher intends to study 
by use of a single method in data collection.  
 
To get a deep narration and description of roles’ expectation from AWF and the 
donor for villagers implementing REDD+ Project in the Kolo Hills, it was 
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necessary to conduct interviews, to observe directly, and survey different 
documents as source of secondary data. In-depth interviews with villagers, former 
Norwegian Embassy staff, Kondoa District forest officers, and the NGO Project 
Coordinator were conducted.  
 
Group and individual interviews were used as they provided opportunities for 
elicitation of opinions, experiences and perceptions about the REDD+ process 
and its operations. Similarly, they helped to grasp information about change of 
roles and perceptions over time in regard to forest conservation and management. 
Through observation the researcher was able to see and comprehend what was 
really happening concerning the REDD Project, its operations so far and how it is 
perceived by the villagers. 
 
i. Individual Interviews 
According to Neuman and Robson (2009), qualitative research interviews involve 
a mutual sharing of experiences between the researcher and the respondent. It is 
the presentation of how respondents speak, think and organize reality as per their 
experiences. The rationale behind the application of interviews was due to its 
flexibility and its ability to make respondents open up freely. In addition, 
interviews are good as they help in discovering the underlying motives and 
desires. Before starting the interview the researcher has to design the guiding 
questions and build the ‘rapport’, that is,the respondents’ consent.  
 
In the field, a total of 95 semi-structured individual interviews were conducted 
with villagers, village officers, Kondoa District council officials, AWF project 
facilitator and an informant from the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The 
aim was to get their personal perspective, attitudes and experiences towards role 
implementation and motivating factors towards the implementation of the REDD 
Project in the Kolo Hills. Most of the interviews were recorded except in those 
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meetings where the respondents were uncomfortable to be recorded. For those 
four (4) respondents who were afraid of being recorded the major points were 
documented in a notebook. This study applied both projective and non-projective 
interviews in all instances. 
 
ii. Focus Group Discussions 
Two focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with villagers in both 
participating and non-participating villages. This data collection method was 
applied so as to get a holistic view of how the REDD Project has been 
implemented, the roles, and the willingness to conform. Ulin et al. (2002) asserts 
that, FDGs give the researcher an ample time to make confirmation and 
comparison of the views attained during individual interviews and asks additional 
questions to minimize contradictions. With FDGs people tend to feel empowered.  
 
I moderated these discussions by introducing key issues from the guide and then 
leaving participants free to discuss and explore the theme as they wish. The 
discussions were recorded under the participants’ consent. 
 
iii. Direct Observation 
Neuman (1991:355) asserts that, “the field researcher scrutinizes the physical 
setting in order to capture its atmosphere and the context… so as to observe 
people and their actions”. Direct observation was done while proceeding with 
data collection using other instruments. Observation was a day-to-day activity 
while in the field. Likewise, I attended to several village meetings as another way 
of observing. Key issues relevant to the study were noted in the notebook.  
 
iv. Documentary Review 
The review of other documents concerning the REDD+ roles and how the locals 
and other stakeholders perceive them was done so as to complement the primary 
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data. Resources such as AWF documents concerning REDD in Kolo Hills, 
REDD+ documents from other pilot projects, from the Norwegian Government, 
Kondoa District council documents concerning JFM and CBFM and other 
publications, were secondary data sources. Before using these data, assessment 
and critical review were carried out to ensure their reliability, suitability and 
adequacy. 
 
v. Validity and Reliability of Study Instruments 
Singleton and Straits (2005) argues that reliability is about stability and 
consistency of the measurement. It is expected that the same measurement should 
provide consistent results when applied in different times by different researchers 
while validity is about the instrument measuring what it claims and is supposed to 
measure.  
 
Applying more than one method of data collection was one way of ensuring 
validity and reliability. In triangulation, the weakness of one method was 
complemented by the strengths of another method.  
 
Another way of improving validity was done through pre-testing of the interview 
guiding questions at Mnenia Village which is among REDD implementers and 
Itololo Village which is among the REDD negative village. These villages were 
chosen because they are informed about REDD. 
 
3.8 Data Analysis Process 
Qualitative data come in a complex way so the researchers need to take the 
procedure of analysis in a very careful and systematic way (Mason 2002). The 
data were transcribed verbatim and coded into patterns and themes in accordance 
with the research questions. Coding of the transcriptions involved picking, 
concentrating and transforming transcriptions into organized summaries which 
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reflected answering the research puzzle. Constant themes emerged were 
identified, explained and analyzed while supplemented by observational notes. 
Documentary review was done to justify the findings. 
 
3.9 Ethical Considerations 
Before going to the field, I obtained a research permit from the Institute of 
Resource Assessment (IRA) of the University of Dar es Salaam. This permit was 
taken to AWF offices in Arusha Tanzania and Kondoa District Council 
respectively so as to get access to villages in Kondoa District.  
 
In the villages the villagers were informed of the research and its purpose, so that 
they could decide whether or not to participate in the study. Respondents were 
asked for free and informed consent to participate in the study. They were also 
assured of confidentiality of the information they provided as well as anonymity 
of their identity. To avoid name/designation mentioning, I assigned pseudo-
names to all the respondents. For example, villages were assigned the following: 
C.V for CBFM villages, J.V for JFM villages, Ng.V for negative villages, and 
N.V for neighboring villages. Moreover, project personnel were assigned PPs, VL 
for village leaders, while ordinary villagers were assigned the letter V and 
committee members were named CM. Moreover, the use of digital voice recorder 
was done only with consent by the interviewees. 
 
Furthermore, I did my best to adhere to and respect the research code of the 
University of Oslo which insists on such things as source recognition, honesty, 
accountability, and transparency. Thus, I avoided the misconducts emphasized by 




4:  DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the findings and discussions for each of the two research 
questions. Initially, it presents the roles, which the donor and the African Wildlife 
Foundation expect the villagers to accomplish and finally, the extent to which 
villagers agree and comply with the roles assigned to them in the REDD+Pilot 
Project in the Kolo Hills. I will emphasize the role description in the analysis of 
the documents from the Norwegian government documents and the African 
Wildlife Foundation, individual interviews with the project personnel and direct 
observation made by the researcher. Examination of the role compliance will be 
addressed basing on the interviews with village officers, committee members and 
forest scouts as well as ordinary villagers of Irangi (Kolo).These two research 
questions are then compared to see the total comprehension of the role at the 
project level and the role provider. 
 
4.1 Roles which the Donor and AWF expect the Villagers to Accomplish 
I want to use AWF (2010) also referred to in Maganga (2012) to draw the main 
description about role expectation, and thereafter I proceed to the specific roles. 
Presented in Table 4.1 is the framework indicating the key roles for ARKFor 
project. From this framework, Kolo community members are presented as the 
primary implementers and beneficiaries; the Norwegian Government is presented 
as the provider of financial support, advisor and overseer while AWF is put in the 









Table 4.1: ARKFor Key Partners and their Key Roles 
Actor! Roles!
Norwegian Government! Financial support 
Overseer and Advisor of overall 
project direction and progress.!
African Wildlife Foundation! Project coordination and facilitation!
Kolo hills communities! Primary implementers and 
beneficiaries!
Source: Modified from Maganga (2012). 
 
4.1.1 Roles of Villagers from the Donor Perspective. 
The presentation of this part is based on the villagers’ roles as specified by the 
Norwegian Government (represented by the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania). 
Through its International Climate and forest Initiative (ICFI) the Norwegian 
Government is supporting a total of nine pilot projects including ARKFor. As 
explained by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009:1) 
 
 “…the goal of the project (ARKFor) is to contribute to the poverty 
reduction and climate change mitigation by enhancing Tanzania’s 
capacity to use REDD mechanism for rural communities to reap 
tangible benefits from improved forests management and 
conservation”.  
 
The Norwegian Government has assigned the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es 
Salaam the role of overseeing and advising all the activities regarding to the 
Project. 
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifies the villagers in Kondoa as 
key implementers of the REDD Project both as beneficiaries and key actors in 
participatory forest management to date and in the future.  It extends that REDD 
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activities will be participatory whereby all villagers will participate through 
public hearings, meetings, forums, and outreach programs. The following is the 
quote from the contract, 
 
        “Communities of Kolo hills and partners in government at the 
Kondoa district level will serve as key implementing partners both 
from the point of view of serving as target beneficiaries of capacity 
building, but also actors in JFM in the immediate and long term. 
Project activities will be designed through participatory framework 
with involvement of local community leaders and villagers through 
public hearing assemblies and awareness creation forums and 
outreach plans…. and participate in training and capacity building 
activities” (NMFA 2009:13). 
 
I have examined the contract between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and AWF regarding ARKFor as well as other relevant documents from the 
Norwegian Embassy.  Villagers` roles are explicitly defined through general 
provisions regarding involvement and participation. For instance, in the contract 
output 3 of the project description Kolo communities are presented as key 
implementers of forest and land management that will involve “forest 
management and land use planning activities”. Other statements in the contract 
insist on ‘local people’s involvement’ and ‘participation’ by using the already 
existing participatory forest management frameworks in implementation.  Thus, 
villagers are to take part in two ways: through JFM and community based forest 
management.  
 
Inferring from the above general statements concerning villagers’ roles, one needs 
to examine the roles stipulated in the Tanzania’s participatory forest management 
so as understand what the Norwegian Government expects the villagers to 




Through participatory forest management communities are engaged 
in land use planning and integrated activities to change agricultural 
and charcoal production practices…the Norwegian support to REDD 
in Tanzania has a strong focus on competence and capacity building 
(Klepsvik, 2012:1). 
 
Basing on these general statements it was necessary to consult other sources for a 
more elaborate and explicit way of role expectation. 
 
The interview I conducted with the former official at the Norwegian Embassy in 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania argued that the donor was not too prescriptive in regard to 
villagers’ role under REDD+. The reason was that of leaving everything at the 
local level for them to determine what suits them best. All they wanted is to help 
Tanzanian communities to reduce loss of forests so as to tackle the problem of 
climate change as well as to work on their livelihoods. 
 
In addition, he elaborated that; with the introduction of the REDD+ Project in the 
Kolo Hills there was no any legal binding instrument to bind the Embassy’s 
agreement with the local people. However, there were project launching village 
meetings, which were documented for future reference. Furthermore, villagers are 
informally accountable to the NGO facilitating the project.  
 
On the other side, the Tanzanian government was not fully involved in the project 
operations due to the corruption scandal of 2009. The Norwegian government 
found out that their grants channeled to the environmental sector in Tanzania of 
about 30 million USD were missing. This has been settled but still the Norwegian 
government was not comfortable for the government of Tanzania to have fully 
mandate of the REDD fund (REDD-Monitor 2012). 
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4.1.2 Villagers’ Roles as planned by Project Personnel 
Until October 2012 there was no any legal contract between Kolo Hill villagers 
and AWF regarding their roles and involvement in REDD+. 
 
When interviewed, the entire Project personnel affirmed for the fact that most of 
the roles to be performed by villagers under REDD+ are derived and modified 
from Tanzania’s PFM guidelines. They referred to the Forest Act of 2002 that has 
made an important change in forest resource ownership and management 
obligations to incorporate and involve directly local communities. It is from this 
transformation where PFM emerged as a central element in ensuring 
sustainability in managing and protecting Tanzania’s forests.  
 
Moreover, in all interviews with the experts (project coordinator and KDC 
officials), they told me that villagers are supposed to be the sole implementers of 
the REDD+ Project at the ground, and so all the responsibilities were to be guided 
and shaped by themselves in their collectiveness or through representation. 
Furthermore, these informants also told me that all villagers have a responsibility 
in managing and ensuring that the forest is not destructed. The key government 
official responsible for forest issues referred to the participatory forest 
management guidelines for Kondoa District when advancing the following 
argument:  
 
       “Generally villages involved in REDD Project are said to be the key 
implementers of the project now and after the demonstration phase. 
They are responsible for pinpointing their socio-economic activities to 
identify which one are sustainable and friendly to the environment, 
adopt environmental friendly activities as a source of income, and 




From the interviews with another project personnel it was evident that there were 
forest scouts and village environmental committees which perform roles on 
behalf of all villagers in each village where REDD is implemented. This means 
that these committees undertake the responsibilities that formerly were to be 
accomplished by all villagers. The Village Environmental Committees are 
responsible for all the issues in regard to forest management, land management 
plans and overall conservation programmes. The following are the specific roles 
of the committee as per PP3: 
 
“Committee members in the respective villages have to perform the 
following duties;to set meetings for discussing matters pertaining to the 
management of forest, formulate land use plans which will specify 
different land uses, to oversee the implementation of participatory 
forest management in the village, to coordinate and conduct patrols in 
the forest, to keep records and present them in the village assembly and 
full council meetings, to provide permit and receipts for the fees 
charged from harvesting forest products, to keep accounting and 
financial management of the forest products, and to deal with violators 
of the forest rules (restrictions) by penalizing them. They are also 
participate in carbon assessment. It is from these responsibilities where 
you can see how decentralized this project (REDD+) is and how 
participatory it is. Our duty is to provide a technical and expertise 
advice and support for committee members to perform their duties 
accordingly (PP-3: Interview 2012). 
 
Other project personnel further explained that, for ensuring full participation and 
effectiveness in managing the forest in the project area, respective committees 
and scouts in all REDD+ villages under JFM have united to form an association 
which is called JUHIBEKO (Association of environmental conservation in 
Bereko and Kolo divisions). This association is under the mandate of REDD+ 
village environmental committees, and has to collaborate with the government to 
properly manage the forests. The following quote is from project a representative 
in regard to this: 
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We already have a community organization, which is led by village 
environmental committees participating in REDD+. Actually we have 
not registered and we plan to register it at the district level. They 
(members of this organization) are known as council of representative 
of participating villages. It is called JUHIBEKO. .... It is an 
arrangement for 15villages that border the government owned forests 
(PP-3: Interview 2.9.2012). 
 
As summarized by the project personnel two (PP2), key roles of villagers whether 
directly or through representation; is to get involved and participate fully in 
management of land and forests as well as benefiting from those forests. It is also 
expected that, these villagers should collaborate with the government in 
overseeing proper forest management. This is what he says:  
 
 Local communities are responsible for overall management of      the 
forest in collaboration with the government. They are also entitled to 
benefit from the forest products according to how it will be determined 
by in their meetings (PP2: Interview 2012).  
 
Furthermore, project personnel illustrated that REDD+ Pilot Project in Kolo Hills 
and in other places builds upon participatory forest management (PFM) as its 
entry point. As such it is almost the same roles which were established previously 
under participatory forest management which are to be accomplished during 
REDD+ with some additions on issues of alternative livelihood, land 
management, carbon credit and payment issues.  
 
For sustainability of REDD+, it is very necessary to ensure the capacity of the 
local people who are the primary implementers of REDD+ is well built. The 
situation in Kolo is against Tanzania’s commitment in building the capacity of the 
local people participating in REDD+ during the pilot phase. The National 
Framework for REDD (2009) provides for commitment to ensure that the 
capacity of the local communities is built. It indicates that, local structures would 
be given primacies in all REDD pilot activities. It further provides for 
 63 
involvement of foreign organizations to be encouraged to participate with local 
institutions to improve capacity building in areas where there is limited local 
institution capacity.  
 
Other project personnel have pinpointed the importance of integrating other local 
officers in assisting villagers’ roles in key livelihood issues such as agricultural 
officers, beekeeping, cooperatives and others who may take the lead when project 
ends. Involving them only in the launching of the project and not during the day-
to-day proceedings of the project activities seem to be unviable, as it will limit 
their capacity to act and assist villagers especially when the project is finished. If 
they lack this capacity, it will endanger the sustainability of the REDD+ Project. 
 
On the side of officials there are still ambiguities in terms of what is to be 
performed by villagers especially when the Project ends. The NGO facilitating 
the Project has been contracting other institutions to perform most of the key 
roles of the Project. Many officers are not well integrated in the Project despite 
their experience with the area and the people, which could be an added advantage 
to the project implementation.  
 
4.1.3 Villagers’ Role as Benefit-Recipients 
Parallel to the fulfillment of the day to day project responsibilities, villagers are 
entitled to receive benefits from both the revenues accrued from the project, other 
livelihood improvement services, land planning and the carbon credit as a way of 
compensation from abstaining from using the forests. The carbon credit will be 
received as a result of their participation in REDD+ as well as offering the 
ecological service by reducing emissions to a certain level.  
 
Concerning livelihood alternatives, all the project personnel said that, all villages 
implementing REDD+ will benefits from the introduction of energy efficient 
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stoves which would use a small amount of charcoal. Additionally, there would be 
introduction of hydro-foam brick-making technology so as to reduce the amount 
of trees used in making clay bricks. Further, they would be supplied with tree 
seedlings so as to rely on home-planted trees, and modern toilets would be 
constructed. Insistence will be made on agriculture whereby introduction of 
agricultural extension services such as modern seeds, fertilizers, and other kinds 
of training would be made available. Alternative livelihood sources were 
introduced as a way of helping villagers not to return to their normal ways of life 
that was seen unfriendly to the forests. Such ways were heavy reliance on fuel 
wood, poor farming practices, and over reliance on agriculture. 
 
So far, until when I finished my fieldwork in the late of October 2012, some few 
villagers were already given modern agricultural seeds, fertilizers and other 
training on good farming, (at least 12 villagers in each of the REDD+ 
implementing villages), tree planting programs, and sustainable energy 
alternatives training. The Norwegian Ambassador to Tanzania affirms for over 
170 villagers/farmers who received improved seeds and other agricultural 
extension services that have resulted in increase in yields eighty times in the 
demonstration farms.  
 
On land use plans the Ambassador had this to say “Under the committee of 50:50 
gender composition, ten villages have completed land use planning as a means of 
considering long term aspirations to form the basis of securing land tenure and to 
achieve permanence in protecting forests” (Klepsvik, 2012:2). 
 
I asked one of the project personnel about the carbon credit specifically the 
amount of carbon measured and the amount of money expected to reach the 
villages. He explained that the amount of carbon they have already measured is 
1.6 million tons that includes only the biomass; they expect to save 20,500 
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million tons of carbon in the area until the project ends. Basing on the amount of 
carbon stored in their stock (1.6 million tons), test payment was planned to 
complete by early 2013 covering 21 REDD+ implementing villages. All villages 
were to receive the amount of USD 60,000/= whereby the estimated number of 
villagers in those villages is 61,000. The Project personnel interviewed said the 
following: 
 
“The money will probably be released in early next year (2013). For 
us we do not have much compared to other pilot projects, it will be 
like 60,000 US dollars for 21 villages. In those 21 villages we have 
about 61,000 villagers. They said that instead of giving that money to 
individuals we should direct it to the construction of village land 
registry or a good village office because most of them do not have 
good offices” (PP-3: Interview 2012). 
 
For the coming test payment, every family in participating villages will receive 
less than 1 USD for the carbon stored. But in the future, villages under JFM will 
share benefits with the central government. The government will receive 60% of 
the carbon credit while 40% will go to villages bordering the government forests. 
In CBFM all 100% will go to the villages.  
 
Other project personnel affirmed that there was no any formal legal agreement 
between villagers and the donor/AWF explicitly describing the benefits that 
villagers are going to receive. Instead, he provided for the availability of the 
records of village meeting minutes explaining the decisions reached in every 
issue related to REDD+ project including the benefits. He had this to say: 
 
“In reality there is no any legal contract between the NGO, the 
Norwegian government and the villagers concerning their 
participation and the benefits they are going to get. The project 
people orally presented all the benefits we are talking about, and 
each village documented them during village meetings when this 
project was introduced” (PP-1: Interview 2012). 
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In addition, he asserted that, villagers are promised by the NGO the financial 
recompense if they refrain from using the forest in the way they used before 
REDD+, and it is the main reason that makes REDD+ a win-win strategy. With 
this strategy villages take part in reducing emissions, and they are in turn entitled 
to financial and other non-financial compensation. 
 
Fulfillment of the promises made specifically on benefits is essential for 
determining the way villagers will take up the roles ascribed to them. The Project 
has its part to play and so to demand villagers’ side to be fulfilled. 
 
Contrary to the above, some of the officials interviewed seem to be pessimistic 
concerning the project benefits to villagers. They pointed to the issues of benefit 
sharing as critical issues under discussion. Since the government will have to 
centralize all the payments and then channel them back to the villages, there might 
be some problems. Issues like corruption, unnecessary bureaucracies, and 
mismanagement may affect the expected benefits. 
 
4.1.4 Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in Tanzania: The foundation 
on of REDD+ Roles 
 
REDD Project in Tanzania is building upon the already existing institutional 
framework of participatory forest management (that is, joint forest management 
and community based forest management).  
 
Participatory forest management is one of the efforts designed strategically to 
address deforestation through the involvement of the forest-neighboring 
communities in the 1990’s after realizing the effect of the gap created between 
nature and people during the era of ‘protectionist conservation’. The aim is partly 
to integrate the social, ecological and economic goals in conservation by 
involving the locals in conservation projects and that local people have more 
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knowledge about how well to take care of forests in a sustainable way because 
they are nearby (MNRT, 2009; Vihemäki, 2005). Baldus et al (1991). Mshale 
(2008) calls participatory forest management as “conservation by the people and 
for the people” focusing on the bottom-up approach so as to benefit the locals 
through sustainable management.  
 
As provided for by the Tanzania National Forest Policy (1998) and Tanzanian’s 
Forest Act (2002), community participation in forest management in Tanzania 
was implemented and encouraged through different ways, including introduction 
of village forests reserves (VFRs) that are under management and ownership of 
villagers and establishment of joint forest management which is a co-management 
between the government and villagers adjacent to the central 
government/reserved forests.  
 
Vihemäki (op. cit) suggests that, PFM is practiced so as to promote active 
participation of people in planning, management, use and conservation of forest 
resources. It is also a way of devolving responsibilities of land ownership from 
the central government to the lower units of the society (communities). JFM 
basically aims at capturing local support in conservation of forests and so to 
stimulate conservation in those forests that were left unattended, as they were 
known to be under the central government’s management. Under this category 
benefit sharing between the two is 40% for villages participating, and 60% for the 
central government. 
 
MNRT (2009:11) provides Duru-Heitemba as one of the earliest forests to 
implement participatory forest management in Manyara Region after opposition 
against “command and control” system by villagers. Other forests like Mgori in 
Iringa had later imitated from Duru-Heitemba.  Other forests like Gologolo forest 
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(Tanga) and forests in Morogoro, Kilimanjaro, Mtwara, and Arusha followed the 
implementation. These cases were found in different parts of Tanzania.  
 
Under CBFM villagers are able to formulate their own forest and land 
management plans that specify where to graze, where to farm, where to get 
firewood, where to construct residence and other arrangements. Plans are 
supplemented by rules and regulations that later on become bylaws with legal 
recognition to shape adherence of the above plan. With the availability of plans 
and bylaws, in the long run they will obtain title deeds that will give them legal 
ownership right to be owners of the forest.  
 
Current implementation of PFM in Tanzania goes hand in hand with the 
implementation of other income generating activities, environmental education 
and farm forestry for the purpose of supporting conservation (Vihemäki, 2005). 
 
PFM has a clear legal back up from both the Forest Policy of 1998and Forest Act 
of 2002. For instance the Act enables local communities to gazette, announce or 
declare forest reserves as villagers’, and allow the villagers to enter into 
agreement with the government or other owners for JFM agreements…” the act 
“delegates responsibility for the management of forest resources to the lowest 
possible level of local management consistent with the furtherance of national 
policies”. It is from this legal set-up that makes Tanzania the best country with 
the strongest local institutional set-up in the sector of natural resources 
management in the countries residing in the south of the Sahara (URT-MNRT 
2009 Referred in URT, 2002).  
 
i. Tanzania PFM Models and Roles 
Table 2.1 is the classification of villagers’/communities’ roles as stipulated in 
PFM guidelines. In the case of Kolo Hills there is neither a private nor 
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community forest. The only applicable for Kolo Hills is village land forests, 
which is under community based forest management and central government 
forest, which is managed jointly.   
 
Table 4.2: Tanzania PFM models and roles 
Legal interpretation! Roles of Individuals 
and communities in 
management!
Common designation!
VLFRs management by 
the entire community!




managed by a particular 
entitled group in the 
community authorized 
by village council!
Owner and manager! Community Based 
Forest Management!
Private Forest managed 
(PF) by individual 
designated households.!
Owner and Manager! Private Forest 
Management!
JMA where management 
responsibility is shared 
between either central 
government/local 
government and forests 








Designated Manager! Joint Forest 
Management (this form 
is rarely practiced)!
Source: Adapted from URT-MNRT (2009) 
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ii. Challenges Associated with the Implementation of PFM in Tanzania 
Interestingly, the Forest Act (2002) does not provide an elaborate definition of 
PFM but defines in general participatory forest management as “a general, 
umbrella term developed by Tanzanian practitioners that describes different 
approaches to involving community members in the management of forests, both 
through community management as well as co-management approaches” (URT- 
MNRT, 2009). Besides, it is noted in Yanda (2012) that the central government 
has excessive control over forest management in all lands due to constitutional 
provisions that empower the president to hold the land on behalf of all the people. 
The Ministry for Natural Resources, the division of environment, the Vice 
President’s Office is likewise responsible for all local and international matters 
and negotiation related to environmental issues forests inclusive. The powers said 
to be decentralized seem to be more theoretical than in actual ways due to 
overlapping of these legislations. 
 
Vihemäki (2005:1) in the course of presenting the politics of participatory forest 
management in Tanzania asserts that,  
 
“…the implementation of participatory conservation strategies is 
shaped by and shapes the power relationships between state and 
community actors. The present conservation strategies are formally 
“participatory”, but the actual functioning of forest control is affected 
by other factors, such as the economic and political interests of the 
actors involved, and the history of people-state relationships. The 
involvement of “local people” in forest conservation does not make it 
a smooth and apolitical process: power relations between various 
actors intervene in the processes, and make forest control a complex, 
fragmented and dynamic issue”.  
 
This assertion is supported by the current situation in Tanzania where in some 
instances political interests and decisions override the goal of participation.  
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Moreover, Vihemäki (op cit) criticize participation in natural resource 
management as suffering from the ‘economic bias’ simply because local people 
are taken as mere beneficiaries and not as key actors in decision making with all 
the powers in natural resource management and hence further deforestation and 
degradation. 
 
Other literature depicts that, in CBNRM there is a tendency of treating rural 
communities as a homogeneous entity and forget that there are differences in 
gender, caste, wealth, ethnicity, age and origin. Further marginalization of 
minority groups like women, children and the poor in resource accessibility and 
benefits distribution is likely to be accelerated. This necessitates for a thorough 
reassessment of institutions, varied interests, and power relations in participatory 
natural resource management (Jones, 2006).  
 
Other issues like negative attitudes consequent from the previous conservation 
projects, inequitable distribution of benefits accrued from the project, and human 
wildlife conflicts are said to be among the challenges affecting conservation in 














4.2 The Extent the Villagers Agree and Comply to the Roles Assigned to 
them in the REDD+ Pilot Project 
This section presents the findings for the research question two that explored the 
conformity and compliance level among villagers to the given roles. Villagers had 
different perceptions and stands in regard to role compliance. It is from these 
varied perceptions that I decided to group them into three (3) categories namely: 
REDD-Ready villagers, REDD-Positive but disappointed villagers, REDD-
Negative villagers. These standpoints were identified from the interviews with 
different villagers from both CBFM as well as JFM. For reference purposes, the 
number of villagers in the categories of REDD+-Ready and Negative is 
summarized in Appendix 4. The standpoint of each category is well presented 
below. 
 
4.2.1 REDD-ready Villagers 
This group is mostly dominated by village leaders and committee members. They 
feel that their forest has been destructed by human activities and extended 
pressuret o the environment and so it is time to have a sustained use and 
conservation. The main argument for supporting the project is that destruction of 
the environment has caused and will continue to cause the shortage of rain as well 
as scarcity of other natural resources. They seem not to understand the role of the 
forest in reducing the adverse effects of climate change but they seem to 
understand the intrinsic value of environmental and forest conservation; as 
something inherently good regardless of what they get or miss today from the 
forests. The following respondent has the following to say; 
 
“If we dont preserve the forest we are unlikely to have enough 
rainfall, trees for construction and other products in the future.  
Personally, I am very happy for this project because people will 
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no longer distruct the mountains. Every sub-village in this area has 
its own Forest (VL -1: Interview August 2012).  
 
Another respondent added the following; 
 
We understand nothing about CO2 credit and other associated issues, 
we just hear it from experts. For the villagers in this area the most 
important for us to accept is our forest which is the main source of 
rainfall no any other reasons (V-6: Interview August 2012). 
 
 Very few villagers told me that they put project benefits as their reason for 
complying with AWF and donor roles. In this category, the main proposition was 
that of what the project promised to bring especially the carbon credit. Below is the 
depiction from another REDD-ready villager; 
“They told us to either refuse or accept the project, but for me this 
project is something to obviously accept because it is very 
beneficial. See, they told us to not destruct the forest because 
sponsors will come to pay us in exchange of taking our carbon gas. 
Individuals who plant their own trees will get their portion too (CM-
2: Interview 2012).  
 
On another hand, some villagers have argued that leaders and committee 
members mostly support the project due to the fact that they benefit from project 
seminars, and workshops. Thus they argue in favor of the Project not because 
they believe in it, but mostly because it may bring benefits to them as village 
leaders. In the line of this observation, Green has the same proposition in his 
article about ‘globalizing development in Tanzania’ that, professionals of 
development projects in Tanzania and in other places has a tendency of 
conducting seminars and workshops in expensive hotels located far from the 
project site, where the villagers’ representatives attend and receive high 
allowances. In the workshops they therefore tend not to argue against the views of 
those arranging the workshops. This is because they do not see it right to 
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challenge their financiers. However, they also benefit from these workshops 
individually through allowances and other resources (Green,2003). 
 
4.2.2 REDD-Positive-but-Disappointed Villagers 
This category entails villagers disappointed by the REDD+Project in the process, 
benefits, costs and impact of REDD+ to their well-being. Issues of restrictions, 
limited benefits and disappointment with the process are the things that led to 
shift the positive-minded to negativity in perception. In most cases REDD+ is 
affecting both men and women in a different way due to differences on items that 
they used to get from the forest. 
 
Interviewees in this group told me that they were attracted by the promises that 
were made during the launching of the REDD Project. They also said that these 
promises were not fulfilled as per their expectations and so they have changed the 
mind. The major promise was on carbon credit and some other promises which 
were based highly on improvement of livelihood sources such as improvement in 
agriculture through; provision of modern agricultural seeds and good farming 
training, provision of sustainable energy stoves, introduction brick making 
technology, bee-keeping, tree planting as an alternative source of firewood, and 
construction of modern toilets as one way of reducing wooden-toilets which 
increases tree usage.  
 
Speaking while disappointed, villagers aired out their complaints against the 
Project coordinators and their committee members for not fulfilling their 
promises accordingly as very few members of the village benefited from the 
project. For instance, some villagers told me that only two villagers had been 
given materials for modern toilet construction and only 11villagers had been 
trained on good farming practice and received modern agricultural seeds.  
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Speaking with a lot of fury, a villager in the group interview had the following to 
speak out; 
 
They promised us that there would be a certain percentage of 
money we would get from carbon trade although they did not 
specify how much. They also promised to provide the village 
environmental committee with facilities such as uniforms, and 
the office but nothing came up until now. At the moment, there 
are only very few village members (mostly leaders) who 
benefited and not the majority of villagers. I don’t see why we 
should proceed with this project because what they promise is 
not what they exactly do (V-12: Interview 2012). 
 
Another male member of the FGD had this to say: 
 
When they launched their project in Kolo, they told us that 
sponsors of this project would help us construct modern toilets 
so that we don’t use trees; they provide us with photographs of 
the expected toilets to be built. Later on they took those 
photographs and no toilets were constructed. I was told to dig a 
toilet hole that is in my house until today. Contrary to their 
promise they brought only two bags of cements, six iron-sheets, 
and one toilet-net for construction of two toilets for two Kolo 
villagers (V-23: Interview 2012).  
 
In the same FGD another male villager added; 
 
Most of the donors’ money is misused and spent by officers who 
live among us. An ordinary villager who is concerned with day-
to-day environmental conservation activities is bypassed by the 
so-called AWF. AWF brings its own people and other 
institutions to pay them so as they perform duties that would 
have been performed by the villagers in our area (V-29: 
Interview 2012).  
 
There have been queries from villagers concerning the functioning of JUHIBEKO 
association and its mandate. Ordinary villagers feel that JUHIBEKO was formed 
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without their consent and that is why it is operating on its own ways as it 
penalizes people heavily as well as lack of transparency in its dealings. In 
presenting their discontent with the association, the following villager had the 
following to say to affirm this; 
 
This project is oppressive and unfair to us. In the first instance we 
agreed but later they formed JUHIBEKO; which link together some 
scouts and committee members. Scouts and other JUHIBEKO 
leaders have been over- charging us for their own benefits. It has 
transformed itself as another way of conducting illegal deals. This 
association has sometimes bypassed the village committee members 
and work with village scouts on their own. I suggest of removing 
this association so that each village takes responsibility of their own 
forest area (V-48: Interview 2012). 
 
The above dissatisfaction about the functioning of JUHIBEKO has led to several 
incidents of attack and life threats by villagers to JUHIBEKO scouts and 
committee members whereby there are scouts who were injured. One attack 
incident was reported to the Kondoa police station and further legal procedures 
were taken.  
 
They also see the project as non-beneficial to them and it extends the burden to 
them, as it did not come with the tangible and viable alternatives. Nowhere to 
feed their cattle, no more free places to get firewood, no clear demarcations for 
where they can conduct different activities and the reserve. To them, the project is 
adding fewer benefits than the costs they incur for conservation. They see the 
project as denying them some of their basic survival needs. The following 
assertion depicts this: 
 
Even if the tree branch is at your home premise, if you cut it you 
have to pay the fine of not less than 50,000/=Tshs. Most 
Tanzanians are very poor. So how can they live without firewood? 
We do not have even places to graze our cattle, look the way they 
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are weak. Few days ago there were people who were caught in the 
reserve collecting water and were penalized to pay 100,000/= for 
just fetching water. This is contrary to our former agreement; they 
(AWF and other Officers) put these issues on their own in the new 
bylaws they sent us contrary to what we suggested. On top of that 
this project is run like a personal project, no transparent accounting 
records which shows project revenues and expenditure (V-58: 
Interview 2012).  
 
I found it important to inquire from the AWF.  The project facilitator admitted 
that some of the promises were not fulfilled. He saw livelihood issues as a 
particular problem and he argued that this was because the AWF`s contractor has 
not done it in a satisfactory manner. This contactor, Selian Institute of 
Agriculture, was mistakenly chosen without thorough review of its competence. It 
was after the feasibility study in 2012 when they realized that this contractor was 
only competent in agricultural issues. After this study the contact was reviewed 
and signed to other experts who are competent in non-farm livelihood aspects. On 
the inequity of the distribution of other benefits, he admitted that it is true those 
who benefited so far especially on good farming seeds and training were very few 
simply because it is impossible for the project to train all the farmers due to 
limited financial resource.  
 
As reported by REDD-Monitor organization (2012), the same disappointment has 
happened to other REDD+ projects in other countries implementing REDD 
specifically in Panama. The project under the UN-REDD is alleged of not 
fulfilling some of the promises made to indigenous citizens in regard to their real 
benefits particularly the promised fund. This un-fulfillment has led to frustrations 
among the primary beneficiaries and so they decided to withdraw from the project 
after failure of all the possibilities to get what they thought they would get as per 
UN-REDD representative promise (they were promised to receive $1.79 million 
for starting up REDD activities).  
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The report extends that the representatives of the indigenous people in Panama 
feel that REDD do not guarantee the respect and safeguard of the indigenous 
rights, no full and true participation of the people of Panama in project 
implementation, and it has been characterized by many other incongruence and 
inconveniences. They even feel that they are used by the REDD process. Arguing 
concerning the UN’s commitment to observe and respect the rights of the locals, 
Loayza (2011) presented in REDD-Monitor website provides that: 
 
“UN-REDDhas made itself clear that; REDD+’s success will 
depend on the respect of indigenous rights and forest-dependent 
populations. Thus, consultation processes must follow general 
principles of fair access to information based on free, prior and 
informed consent of local communities involved”. 
 
Hance (2012) adds that these discontents are happening not only resulting from 
funds but also it is something happening worldwide as the indigenous people are 
not very sure of their rights and livelihood security. He says, “The disputes, 
however, is about much more than just funds. Indigenous groups around the 
world are worried that they could be steamrolled by the REDD+ process, as they 
have been by many other past international and national initiatives”. 
 
Arguing in regard to indigenous people disappointment, it is true that local people 
are making their own cost-benefit analysis as a way of assuring their own security 
and protection. They are in the process of making careful economic and social 
calculations of the tangible benefits the respective project has brought to their 
daily life. If they are clear that they don’t benefit from the projects individually, 
and in that case they have no sense of ownership of those projects then they start 
withdrawing. This signifies why most of the projects run by the NGOs and the 
government are not sustainable.  
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This part has identified why some villagers in the Kolo Hills feel disappointed 
despite their acceptance of REDD in the first place. The project is yet to deliver 
the promises it made during its launch. It is very clear that if villagers remain 
disappointed, they are likely to go back to their normal ways of living, which 
would result into more danger to the forests and the REDD+Project in general. 
Also without securing their livelihood it is very hard for their survival while 
implementing REDD+. 
 
4.2.3 REDD-Negative Villagers 
Most of the villagers under this category are found in villages where the majority 
of the villagers oppose REDD+ Project. However, some villagers where REDD+ 
is accepted they are also negative to the project. They seem to be well informed 
of the agreed prerequisites of REDD+ implementation. This category entails 
villagers who see REDD+ as totally non-beneficial to them. One of the arguments 
is that, over time, they have been conserving their forests and other natural 
resources in their own ways by using different ways of ensuring social control 
and order so as to avoid misuse and destruction of the forests. The following 
quote from the group discussion conducted with REDD+-Negative villagers 
affirm this contention: 
 
There have been environmental conservation programs before 
REDD+. This mountain has been well protected. We used to 
conserve the water sources, we were not allowed to make charcoal, 
nor cut un-dried trees. Fines were agreed which people were 
supposed to pay whenever they violated the bylaws. Due to these 
principles we were able to manage well our forests and that is why 
REDD people were attracted and they wanted to take our mountain 
(V-60: Interview 2012). 
 
In addition to the above reason for negativity, the experience from the 
neighboring villages implementing REDD has highly influenced those who have 
not yet implemented the project and therefore resisting the process. The argument 
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they pose is that, REDD has made people strangers in their own land as they are 
no longer allowed to access the products which belong to their land. Also the 
fines people have to pay when caught in the forest makes them to be against the 
project. Some have compared giving out their forest as “taking an orange for 
exchange with gold” and others said”REDD+ is like a man who forces a lady to 
be his fiancée”. These expressions from the people who are negative to REDD+ 
reveals how they perceive their land to be worthy but also the power and the right 
to self-determination. One villager asserted the following, 
 
“What we saw from our fellows implementing REDD+ is that, as soon 
as they accepted to implement the project in their villages, they were 
restricted to reach to some areas in their own villages and access some 
of the basic needs from the forests. We saw how they are pitilessly 
penalized and jailed after REDD+ operations in their respective 
villages. This is what made us to refuse this project as we depend 
heavily to this mountain”(V-61: Interview 2012).  
 
Another reason for this negativity is the experience they have with other 
conservation projects such as those under TANAPA (Tanzania National Parks).  
Villagers have negative experience with Tarangire National Park and so they are 
directly affected by the Park dealings. Presence of fines, wild animals getting to 
residential areas, too much restrictions and other inhuman acts done to the locals, 
make these villages under this study to make a reference and think that REDD+ 
might also bring the same bad experiences to them. They also think that when the 
forest remains untouched, wild animals will get into their farms and residences to 
destruct their yields and harm them. The following is a quote from one of the 
villager; 
 
“When they came to tell us about REDD, I saw their vehicle labeled 
with the TANAPA logo. We all understand that TANAPA is not a 
good thing because of the things they do to the neighboring 
communities; when they see people in the park with even a very 
small bird they force them to eat it with feathers while un-cooked. 
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We had to think of the possible risks and the way it would be when 
we accept this project and thought that we might put ourselves in 
danger” (V-63: Interview 2012). 
 
This observation affirms Hance’s (2012) argument in the discussion of the 
Panama’s REDD unfulfilled promises that, all over the world indigenous people 
are not feeling secured with REDD+ in most key aspects. They have much 
worries as they may be flattened by the REDD process due to the bad experience 
they already have with the past international and local development programmes. 
 
According to the AWF Project facilitator, another major reason for the negativity 
to the REDD+ process and implementation in some areas is de-politicization of 
the project. Some of the councilors and MP campaigned against REDD as a way 
of winning the votes. If they had supported the project they would have lost the 
election. The politicians’ stand is still embraced by the villagers and so they take 
it as a point of reference to refuse the Project. There was reality in this argument 
as even villagers were referring to their MP that he is also against REDD+.  
 
“Some of our key leaders proved that REDD was something they 
never came across. Our MP put this clearly that REDD is something 
that came from nowhere and it is not understood at all. Imagine, a 
leader who is representing the people is affirming that REDD+ is 
something unknown do you think ordinary villagers would accept it? 
It was obvious that citizens saw this project as something vandalistic. 
We sent our councilor to request the District Commissioner and the 
District Executive Director to come to us and explain more about 
REDD+ but neither of them came until today” (V-65: Interview 
2012).  
 
URT (2010) has the same observation in regard to the political influence. URT 
provides that, in areas where the political opposition wing was strong it created 
the difficulties in installing the project simply because politicians were arguing 
against by bringing in the negative experiences of HADO project.  
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The above fact justifies the notion that REDD+ is not politics free. This project is 
implemented in the political context and not in the air. Administratively, it is the 
politicians who make laws and determine the work (policy) of the day. Inherently, 
political leaders receive villagers’ allegiance because they originate from their 
areas and so they trust them very much. If this project is missing the support of 
the political leaders it is obvious that it will miss an important back up for it to be 
effective and efficient. 
 
However, these citizens insisted on more training and education concerning 
REDD+ as well as learning from other villagers implementing the project so that 
they may be able to understand more about the benefits and other key issues 
before they decide to jump on it. 
 
The discussion under this category signifies people`s power to stand and defend 
what they believe suitable. Having the power to stand on their own regardless of 
the fact that other villagers are implementing this project reveals their capacity 
and power to realize their right to make decisions that favor their own interests. It 
is true that the international community recognize the rights of the indigenous 
people to accept or refuse REDD+ Project if they see it as unsound to them.  
 
The study in the Kolo Hills by Batholdson et al (2012) illustrates unwillingness of 
Kolo people to take up the project, as they don’t feel its ownership. Villagers 







5:  ELUCIDATIONS FOR VARIED COMPLIANCE BETWEEN ROLE 
PROVIDERS AND THE VILLAGERS 
This chapter explains why there were differences in compliance in the roles 
provided to villagers. In presenting this section, REDD+ documents as well as 
interviews with both villagers and project personnel will be used to explain why 
roles introduced to villagers were differently received as presented in 4.2 above. 
The findings presented indicate little compliance and conformity to the roles 
provided to villagers in REDD+ pilot project in the Kolo Hills. I also found that 
the level of compliance to roles was different per area wise depending on the 
level of REDD+ awareness and the ability to fulfill the promises and project 
benefits. Reasons and motivations for role implementation in REDD+ was also 
dependent on the experience they have with the current project as well as the 
previous conservation and non-conservation projects in their area and other 
neighboring areas. These explanations as well as other emerging issues are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Moreover, in this chapter I will present the discussion about REDD+ and the local 
people concerns. This discussion is the depiction of why it is important for local 
roles to be given primacy. 
 
i. Short Project Timeframe 
The timeframe for this project is seen to be short by all stakeholders at the ground 
for them to comprehend it well so as to have one stand. The period of three (3) 
years is not enough to fulfilling all the processes for successful communication 
and acceptance of the project to all villagers. REDD+ has been alleged as an 
initiative from external that needed a long time for the locals to understand it well 
before implementing. The villages that had spent less time in accepting the 
Project earlier were the ones to benefit from the Project but those who were still 
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reluctant they might miss this opportunity.  The following is a quote from the 
project personnel in regard to project timeframe: 
 
             “The time specified by the Norwegian government for AWF to 
complete the REDD project is not enough. Imagine implementation 
of all the activities like that of capacity building, livelihood issues, 
and carbon measurements in three (3) years’ timeframe... do you 
think there will be time to wait for all 21 villages with more than 
61,000 villagers to accept the project? We used the majority rule 
principle to proceed with the project. Those refused might also 
have genuine reasons for their refusal; it is just because we did not 
have enough time to wait for everybody” (PP-1: Interview 2012). 
 
For the purpose of meeting the project timeframe and deliverables it was very 
hard for the project facilitators to wait for a long time for villagers to decide. In 
most villages it took them one to three days to be made ready for implementation. 
In some cases single day was used for introducing the project, asking for 
acceptance and launching the project. This was claimed by villagers to be 
unpleasant to them because they still needed extra time to think about the project 
and its benefits before accepting or refusing it. They claim to be less informed 
about REDD because it was implemented in hurry.  
 
Time factor has not only been a problem to the Kolo Hills pilot project but to 
almost all other REDD+ projects in Tanzania. To address this challenge, AWF 
has asked for extra one-year time (up to 2013) that was already granted to them. 
This would allow them to address remaining issues including those of persuading 
other remaining villagers to accept the Project. 
 
ii. Unfamiliarity with REDD+ 
It was openly said that REDD+ process with its associated terms is very new and 
complicated to both project personnel and villagers for its full understanding and 
implementation. This complication has created difficulties in implementing 
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REDD+ on the ground. This in one way is among the reasons for a varied 
understanding among villagers. Project personnel-2 made it clear that, it has been 
very difficult for them to bring and communicate the project to the villagers in a 
naive and simple way for all to understand. As the result others had refused and 
withdrawn from implementing it while others are getting disappointed. He told 
me the following in his own words: 
 
“REDD+ is a terminology that is new and difficult in terms of the 
process and meanings. For us to implement REDD+ we need to 
undergo a process that I myself don’t think I will get to understand 
all the process from A-Z. It is also difficult to communicate to 
villagers what it is. For instance, matters related to carbon 
measurement are not very easy to present to villagers; processes in 
accessing, designing, mapping, analysis and all other stages to 
validation are very complicated. Many villagers seem to be tired of 
the ambiguities. Others are already disappointed, and others have 
withdrawn because they fail to understand and so there are no well-
defined answers to their questions” (PP-2: Interview 2012). 
 
Another project facilitator, when explaining about the challenges they face in 
implementation, told me that the newness of the REDD+ concept is not only 
back-siding the process but has also compelled for more time in training than 
expected which means more time and resources to gain rapport from the villages. 
Extra resources spent to unexpected rapport issues have resulted to late 
fulfillment of the promises made to villages. This entails that unexpected 
resources used in training could have been used to finance other project issues. 
This extended activity has delayed the whole process and so more financial 
resources were needed to fulfill other promises made to villagers.  The following 
is the quote from the interview:  
 
“Because of the REDD Concept being new to villages, it is so difficult 
and complicated even to educated ones. You take more time in 
awareness and training than expected which means more resources 
and time. We had to use posters, simplified pictures, caps, and 
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brochures to build awareness. Initially we were actually chased in 
many villages because they thought we were there for land grabbing 
also for turning their land to TANAPA or other investors. Because we 
had some people outside the country doing these assessments, they 
thought those were the investors who are coming” (PP-1: Interview 
2012). 
 
Following the unfamiliarity and the newness of the project in their contexts both 
in terms of the project itself, benefits and content, villagers feel confused and 
hence frustrated. These frustrations led to differences in compliance to role 
provided under REDD+.  
 
In relation to awareness building, UNREDD conducted various training courses 
to its parties, Tanzania inclusive concerning REDD+ key issues. Much of the 
awareness building activities and programs were at the national level. More than 
100 staff under the Tanzania Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
participated in the training from 2010 to 2011. In addition, UNREDD participated 
in several public occasions including the Tanzania Annually Trade Fair 
conducted every year in the 7th of July for the purpose of REDD+ publicity 
(REDD+ Newsletter, 2011). However, these training programs were highly at the 
national level and very low at the ground.  
 
In the Amazon, researchers has found that, the newness of the REDD concept 
brings in confusion hence it leads to negative perceptions towards the project. 
Local people saw it like a control mechanism that might dictate them what to do 
and what not to do. For instance, CIFOR organization presents the following 
quote (from Marina Comberg’s findings) to elucidate this; 
 
“The idea of REDD+ is so new to them that it was interesting to see how it 
was perceived by the farmers and how they saw it as an opportunity to 
improve their livelihoods, but it was also interesting to hear about their 
concerns. Many of them see REDD+ as a command-and-control mechanism 
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another external force that has come to tell them what to do and will 
threaten their autonomy” (CIFOR, 2013). 
 
Generally, if the concept itself is unfamiliar and cannot be well grasped and 
communicated to the villagers who are supposed to be primary implementers of 
the project it was discernible to see differences in compliance level hence very 
low adherence to the provided roles. 
 
iii. Poor Participation in Key Decision Making Meetings 
Local people participation in REDD+ processes has been very poor and so most 
of the key decisions are reached by very few members. Poor participation has led 
to ambiguities and poor understanding of the project hence affecting the 
compliance level. The overall percentage of villagers participated in project 
launching as well as day to day implementation meetings in all the sampled 
villages was less than ¼ of the total population in all 21 REDD+ implementing 
villages. It is very hard for the local people to attend village meetings especially 
when the meeting takes place during the production time. Most of the adults made 
it clear that they have been missing village meetings as the meetings were 
scheduled at times when they were busy with other duties like grazing and 
farming. To address this AWF has been paying participants to attend key project 
meetings. 
 
Tz-REDD Newsletter (2010) put it clear that; the same situation is observed in 
the REDD+ implementation in the Southern part of Tanzania. Despite some 
efforts put by MJUMITA/TFCG to raise awareness and participation, both men 
and women have not been attending meetings concerning project’s affairs until 
when they were told that the carbon test-payment was about to be conducted in 
2012. MJUMITA/ TFCG also acknowledged this situation is worse to women 
compared to men.  
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Also, Karl (2000) in his presentation of how to monitor and evaluate 
stakeholders’ participation in agriculture and rural development pinpoints the 
reasons for there is poor participation in most of the rural development. Quoting 
McGee and Norton (2000) Karl illustrates that, rural people especially women do 
not have time to participate in meetings especially when it takes them away from 
production. He further argues that, time has been a limiting factor for a fully 
participation of stakeholders in project activities and other decision making 
meetings especially when they make calculations and find that no immediate 
economic benefits from the project. The solution to this challenge has been 
payment for participants’ time that in some cases seem to be challenging due to 
limited resources. The following quote portrays this: 
 
“Rural people and women in particular, often lack the time to take 
part in meetings and decision-making especially if this takes them 
away from production. Consequently, payment for participants’ time 
has come to be recognized as a factor of raising the quality of 
participation (McGee and Norton, 2000). 
 
iv. Power Abuse by Villagers’ Representatives 
Ideally, most of the roles that were to be performed by all villagers are vested 
under committee members and scouts. Despite the 50:50 ratio of gender 
composition of the committee members, villagers were not comfortable with their 
(the committees and scouts) conducts and in some cases they wanted to have their 
own system that would ensure accountability and proper forest management.  
 
From the findings it was seen that REDD+ project committees and scouts are 
becoming semi-gods as they have all the responsibilities on issues related to 
forests, and they can penalize as they wish because they have that discretion. In 
practice, they are accountable to the NGO facilitating the Project but not directly 
to the villagers whom they represent. This was evident when villagers in one of 
the oldest REDD+ implementing villages asserted that, since they elected 
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committee members and scouts neither normal briefing meeting, nor revenue and 
expenditure meetings was held rather they were busy attending seminars and 
reporting to the NGO office in Kondoa. 
 
v. Poor capacity of the Village Participatory Structures 
The capacity of the village committees to make and influence project decisions 
for the villagers’ interests was seen to be poor. They lack the ability to defend and 
stand for the people they represent hence failure in defending villagers’ interests 
in different REDD+ discussions with the NGO. In most cases they still waited 
and received directions from the NGO facilitating the project. This was evident 
when committee members were bypassed in tree planting activity in Kolo 
Village. There were allegations by some committee members in Kolo that they 
have community-based organizations dealing with tree seedlings for sell but the 
NGO decided to buy tree seedling from the neighboring villages. As a result, the 
bought seedlings were left unattended and so they dried up. The following quote 
supports this point; 
 
“We have several associations but were disappointed and bypassed. 
Villagers are not involved. We told them to buy tree seedlings from 
our village but they went to Mneniya as if we don’t have people 
who have same tree seedlings here. One day I had a call from AWF 
telling me to collect seedlings and distribute them so that we plant 
in our village. Now as you can see, those seedlings dried as no one 
attended them. People were very angry.” (V-18: Interview 2012).  
 
vi. Improper Application of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) 
Roles imposed on the locals were not similarly accepted and perceived due to 
improper and poor application of FPIC. Not all villagers were in a position to 
quickly understand the project so as to implement it. This is because villagers are 
heterogeneous in terms of understanding, education level, resources, gender and 
all other situations. In REDD+ implementation, free and prior informed consent is 
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one of the fundamental benchmarks and prerequisites for REDD+ according to 
the project designers. This is because if the local people willingly accept the 
project it would improve local ownership hence true participation. 
 
However, there have been reported difficulties and complications associated with 
the observance of FPIC process due to being time bound, newness of the REDD 
process, and costs associated with it. From different interviews with the villagers, 
it was reported that implementing FPIC steps was a critical issue in the Kolo Hills 
as the time used was seen to be very short for villagers to understand and 
implement the project. Most villagers admitted that the time was inadequate for 
them to decide, and others complained of misunderstanding the project during the 
initial stages hence further disappointments. The following are expressions from 
different people in regard to FPIC:  
 
“We were not given enough time to sit for a long time for us to 
decide whether we understand the project or not. They said that time 
was not enough for them to come back again for the same issue so it 
was a must to put clear our stand-point whether we want the project 
or not. We had no option rather than trying and seeing” (V-2: 
Interview 2012). 
 
Another one had the following to say 
 
“In the first place we did not refuse. We told them to wait for us so 
that we understand the project after internal discussions within the 
village and the lesson we would learn from other villages. AWF was 
not willing to wait for our time to decide instead they concluded that 
we don’t want to implement the project in our area. We are still 
insisting that more time is needed for us to accept the REDD 
Project. AWF’s too much insistence makes us speculative of its 
motives” (V-66: Interview 2012). 
 
After hearing the above concerns from the villagers, I confronted one of the 
project personnel to get more elaborations from facilitator’s point of view 
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concerning how FPIC was conducted. The major point made was that working 
under a very limited timeframe was not easy for them to spend too much time and 
costs on FPIC issue by waiting for every villager to accept. However, in most 
villages all the decisions made were at least supported by 50% of participants in 
village meetings. He had the following to put in regard to this: 
 
“We spent at least 2-4 days seeking for villagers’ acceptance and 
consent… bound to deliverables, costs, and time. I admit that two 
days were not enough for FPIC, considering the fact that REDD+ is 
a new concept and project for both of us”(PP-2: Interview 2012). 
 
To make REDD+ roles successful, it was necessary for issues of FPIC to be well 
addressed as key determinant of role ownership and adherence. Reflecting upon 
the newness of REDD+ concepts and processes it was necessary to have more 
time in making villagers understand well what REDD is, the benefits associated 
with it, and their obligations before any further decision of implementing the 
project. 
 
Generally, those presented are key issues in explaining differences in compliance 
to roles directed to villagers. This indicates how the villages are not homogenous 
units, but consists of people with different resources and contradictory interests.  
 
The general observation so far indicates that local people are highly affected by 
the impacts of climate change. They also face many challenges due to their 
dependence on the general ecosystem and its land. This reliance makes them 
more vulnerable to climate change than other groups. With this fact, it necessary 
to give them the primary responsibility and roles in designing and implementing 
strategies designed to mitigate and adapt the climate change impacts. The 
rationale behind is their experience with their surroundings in which they were 
able to observe changes in the ecosystem over time would lead to a more relevant 
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knowledge on how to address and mitigate the impact of those changes in the 
ecosystem (Fincke, 2010).  
 
Despite the above observation, local people to some extent have been not fully 
integrated by the REDD+ Project. Hence, they feel uncertain about whether 
REDD+ is really going to safeguard their interests and welfare. This is similar to 
the depiction by URT (2010) that, local people in most places feel insecure with 
the introduction of REDD+ in their areas. URT further brings in the example 
from the REDD+ project in the Kolo Hills where villagers explained their worries 
and dissatisfaction towards project introduction. Their immediate perceptions 
were greatly influenced by the background of previous land related undertakings 
done by Dodoma Land Rehabilitation Program (HADO) that moved many people 
into eroded areas unfairly.  In addition, there was the issue of land grabbing by a 

















6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
STUDY 
This chapter presents the summary of this study, and draws major conclusions 
based on the findings of the study. The chapter also provides recommendations 
on policy issues, actions and for further research.  
 
6.1 Summary of the Study 
This study sought to examine the roles ascribed to villagers in the REDD+ project 
in the Kolo Hills forest in Kondoa District Tanzania.Specifically, this study was 
guided by three research questions namely; what are the roles that the African 
Wildlife Foundation and donors expect villagers to take in the pilot project for 
REDD at Kolo Hills? To what extent the villagers agree and comply with the 
roles assigned to them in the REDD pilot project? And how do issues of role 
compliance and incompliance can be explained?To answer these research 
questions, the study applied qualitative case study method to uncover the truth 
about the theme. However, very few aspects of quantitative methods were 
deployed.  
 
Purposive and simple random sampling techniques were employed in order to 
obtain participants for the study. Purposive sampling was applied to get the 
population of study, whoare Kolo Hills natives. Besides, purposive sampling was 
applied in accessing project personnel, as well as village leaders. This was done 
so as to get key information about the project roles. Moreover, lottery simple 
random sampling was employed to select villages as well as villagers from 
different forest management types for the interviews; both group and individual 
interviews. 
 
The sample comprised 91 villagers from 11 villages implementing REDD+ pilot 
project in the Kolo Hills Kondoa, and fourparticipants from the project level and 
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the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Therefore, this study employed a total 
number of 95respondents. Direct observation, documentary review and interviews 
(both group and individual) were used to solicit information from the 
respondents.  
 
The data collected were transcribed verbatim and analyzed according to the 
content, themes and patterns aroused in the process of transcription. 
 
6.2 Summary of the Findings of the Study 
The major findings of the research were presented and discussed according to the 
research questions. The main preoccupation was to make sure that the research 
questions are answered accordingly. The key issues in relation to the research 
findings are hereunder summarized: 
 
6.2.1 Summary on the Roles ascribed by AWF and Donors to Villagers 
In this aspect, villagers’ roles presented by both the Donor and the AWF were 
basically the roles reflected in the Tanzania’s Participatory Forest Management 
(PFM) framework. In order to understand the villagers’ roles in the REDD+ pilot 
project there is a necessity of going through the PFM strategy. The strategy 
document provides a realm for villagers as forest managers through CBFM and 
JFM, to take part in land use planning activities, and to benefit from whatever the 
forest provides according to the accepted procedures. The framework provides for 
the village environment committees to oversee all the forest activities and other 
environmental issues on behalf of the citizens. 
 
This is behind the rationale that, REDD+ Project is building upon the existing 
local institutional set-up in its implementation. Moreover, another justification for 
reliance on the PFM roles was because the Project did not want to be too 
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descriptive on what they wanted the villagers to perform rather, to make the 
project more participatory hence to have the local ownership. 
Another key finding in this aspect was that of villagers’ roles as benefit 
beneficiaries. From the project perspective, they are entitled to benefit from the 
revenue from the project, livelihood alternatives, land use plans, and the carbon 
credit by the end of the year 2012. 
 
However, there is neither a contract nor any legal binding instrument between the 
Donor or AWF and villagers regarding partaking REDD+ Pilot Project roles. 
Further, there was no any mechanism in place for making villagers claim the 
promises made and the benefits they are entitled in the process of the role 
performance. 
 
6.2.3 Major Findings on the Extent Villagers Complywith Assigned Roles 
I assessed the extent to which villagers comply and conform to the assigned roles 
the findings indicated differences in compliance and conformity. Due to 
differences in conformity and perceptions towards taking up the roles I found it 
necessary to divide them according to their respective viewpoint. I formulated 
three categories namely: REDD-Ready villagers, REDD-Positive but 
disappointed villagers, REDD-Negative villagers. 
 
a) REDD-Ready Villagers 
The findings elucidatethatREDD-Ready villagers are those ones who willingly 
accepted to take the roles ascribed to them under REDD+. They see their forest 
and environment in general to have been degraded and so there is a call for an 
action. Village leaders, as well as village environment committee members 
dominate this group. Conversely, they are alleged to have a positive compliance 
towards the ascribed roles because of the benefits they get by attending REDD+ 
project seminars and workshops. 
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b) REDD-Positive-but-Disappointed Villagers 
The finding in regard to the group of REDD-Positive-but-disappointed is the 
representation of those villagers who previously willingly decided to take the 
roles. This group’s perception is shaped by the disappointment in the process, 
benefits, costs and impact of REDD to their wellbeing.  
 
Formerly, they were attracted to the promises that were made during the 
launching of the project. However, they were disappointed because the promises 
made were not fulfilled according to their expectations. The disappointments 
have made them to change their mind. Among the promises were building of 
modern toilets in the village, provision of agricultural seeds, training them in 
good farming practices, introducing hydra-foam brick making technology, bee 
keeping and tree planting programmes.   
 
They also see the Project as not benefiting them instead it poses the burden on 
them. What they are calculating is what the project has added to them and the 
costs they incur for conservation. The project is adding less than the costs they 
incur for conservation. 
 
c) REDD-Negative Villagers 
From the findings there were villagers who seemed to oppose REDD+ pilot 
project and so perceived it as something intruding to their lives. This was the 
group of the REDD-negative. The reasons behind their negativity are because the 
project is not beneficial to them, and they know that they have the right to accept 
or reject the Project. Also they claim to have their own ways in which they can 
conserve the forests. Moreover, the findings depict that; they have learned 
nothing positive from the neighboring villagers implementing REDD+.  
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In addition, these villagers have a negative story of the previous conservation 
programmes within and outside their areas. Sharing the boundary with the 
Tarangire National Park in Manyara Tanzaniais of a sad experience when talking 
of conservation and protected areas.   
 
6.2.4 Findings on the Explanations of Varied Role Compliance  
In regard to this aspect, I found various explanations as to why villagers were 
having different compliance levels towards role taking under REDD+. Issues 
such as short project time frame, the newness of the REDD concept and program, 
and improper communication of roles to the villagers can best explain the above 
situation. Moreover, poor participation of villagers in village meetings as well as 
in project activities have extended the ambiguities concerning the project and 
hence its non-acceptability in some instances.  
 
In addition, the failure of the Project side to fulfill their promises made during 
project establishment has made villagers to be disappointed and feel frustrated 
concerning the project.  
 
6.3 Conclusions of the Study 
To date, REDD+ as an ambitious climate change solution has opened the way for 
more things to be performed in addressing climate change. However, REDD+ 
roles are inherently ascribed in nature. When roles are ascribed to individuals, 
they come not only with the benefits, but they also bring expectations on the side 
of the role implementer. Role implementers make calculations too of what they 
would gain or lose by taking the roles ascribed to them. If they find that benefits 
are less than losses, they may withdraw or pretending to take up the roles. The 
same situation is happening in the REDDPilot Project of the Kolo Hills. 
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In addition, roles are imposed in contexts where situations are heterogeneous. 
Villagers and their situations are not homogenous units, but consist of people 
with different resources and contradictory interests. It is the right time now for the 
REDD+ project to have full recognition of all these situations so as to address and 
deal with each group differently. 
 
Furthermore, with REDD+ there is a possibility of insecurities because of the 
absence of legally binding instruments. Villagers are likely to keep on taking the 
roles but they would end up in difficulties when claiming back their benefits as 
role implementers.  Inferring from this, REDD+ seems to be a risky business 
whereby some villagers have accepted to devote their time without any legal 
agreement like a contract.  
 
Moreover, despite the REDD+ Project claiming to be a win-win strategy where 
villagers as role performers will benefit and help in reducing their rural poverty, 
the situation is different. REDD+ seems to bring more difficulties to Kolo Hills 
natives than before, as there is no already provided livelihood sources. 
Difficulties in accessing grazing areas, unavailability of places to collect 
firewood, and limited area to cultivate their crops to sustain their lives, seem to 
have been extended under REDD+.   
 
In general, REDD+ is more of a fortress style of conservation despite its claim to 
be a decentralized conservation type. Most of the decisions are still centralized. 
Villagers have little say in regard to their roles and benefits. Most of the key 
decisions are still taken and influenced by the NGO and not an ordinary Kolo 
native. Village environment committees’ capacity to act is still weak. With this 
situation, there is the possibility of having more of marginalization of the local 




Based on the findings and conclusions reached, the following recommendations 
were made: 
 
A. Recommendations for Action 
Since REDD+ is an initiative from outside which ascribed roles to villagers, there 
is a need to plan for an affirmative action to communicate the roles to the 
villagers. This will reduce the ambiguities and misunderstanding and therefore 
role conformity will be high. Special awareness programmes need to be designed 
so as to have awareness building about both the project and the benefits 
associated with the project. Then, villagers will be in a good position to decide 
whether to take part in the project or not to. 
 
Since the REDD+ project has promised villagers certain gains, it is very 
important that these promises are fulfilled accordingly. Not fulfilling the promises 
decreases the credibility of the project to the villagers hence frustration and 
disappointment. Both the donor and the NGO must set mechanisms for fulfilling 
the promised benefits. It is better not to promise rather than to promise and never 
fulfill.  
 
Additionally, the NGO facilitating the REDD+ Project must ensure full 
involvement of all villagers in terms of their gender, age, and other sub 
categories. This will improve their decision-making powers and so to have full 
ownership of the Project. 
 
The livelihood aspect should be seriously insisted for REDD+’s sustainability. 
This is because if it will be taken for granted, there is a possibility of villagers 
going back to their ways of using forests in unfriendly ways. Communities 
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depend much on land and forests for their livelihoods. If their livelihoods are not 
secured they are unlikely to support the Project. 
 
There must be external and internal benefit sharing and distribution mechanism 
that will safeguard villagers’ interests. The strategy must also indicate a gendered 
benefit sharing as men and women access and use forest resources differently and 
so they have different needs. 
 
B. Recommendations for Further Research 
Several issues requiring further investigation emerged from this research. This 
study was based in only one case; Kolo HillsREDD+ Pilot Project. Consequently, 
it will be difficult to generalize the findings to other areas because the sample was 
drawn from few villages and not the whole area of Kolo. Therefore, another study 
should be conducted on other REDD+ pilot projects in other regions of Tanzania 
so as to get the fully picture of roles of villagers and how they comply with them. 
 
Furthermore, a research on the formation and the operation of the villagers’ 
participatory structures in REDD+ project in Kolo Hills Tanzania should be 
carried out.  This is from the assumption that, it is these structures that assume the 
responsibilities of all villagers. Studies on their formation, capacity, and 
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Interview Guide for the Former Officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es 
Salaam Tanzania 
Key question: What are the roles that AWF and donors expect villagers to take in the 
pilot project for REDD at Kolo hills? 
 
Guiding issues: 
0. Narration of the preliminary issues concerning REDD pilot project establishment 
in Tanzania. How was the process?  
1. What does the Norwegian government expect the villagers to accomplish (that is 
roles)?  
2. How? 
3. Was there any legal binding instrument between the Norwegian government and 
the villagers concerning villagers’ participation in REDD? 
4. What are the promises/benefits villagers should expect back when taking up the 
roles ascribed to them?  
5. Is there any mechanism set on how villagers would claim the promises/benefits? 
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6. Are there any obligations associated to role fulfillment?  
7. Reflection of accountability issues 
8. To whom are the villagers accountable?  
 
9. Mechanisms in place for the Norwegian government to ensure the fulfillment of 
promises and benefits from the project to the villagers? 
10. What is the perception so far from the Embassy and Ministry about whether or 







The Interview Guide for the Villagers 
11. Reflections on their understanding of REDD+ project 
12. Reflections on the process before and after the installation of the project. 
13. Overview of what they have been doing before and after the coming of 
REDD+ in relation to conservation. How they take part in day to day project 
activities. 
14. How do they accomplish what they are supposed to accomplish (direct or 
through structeres? If there are structures, further reflection on the formation 
and the composition of those structures). Stress on the role of the villagers.  
15. Examination of why the village participate/not participate in REDD Project 
and why are the village decided so? 
16. An inquiry concerning the availability of incentives that they receive for 
participating in REDDS activities. The type of incentives. 
17. How do the villagers perceive the project and its roles? How do they comply?  
Perception on 
18. Roles they are to accomplish in implementing the project  
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19. Benefits  
20. Equity on benefit distribution, stress on issues of gender and other 
marginalized groups in the community 
21. How just/fair the project is to the stakeholders 









Interview Guide for the Project Personnel 
22. Narration of the preliminary issues concerning REDD pilot project establishment in 
Tanzania. How was the process?  
23. What does the AWF NGO expect the villagers to accomplish (that is roles)?  
24. How? 
25. Was there any legal binding instrument between the Norwegian government /or AWF 
and the villagers concerning villagers’ participation in REDD? 
26. What are the promises/benefits villagers should expect back when taking up the roles 
ascribed to them?  
27. Is there any mechanism set on how villagers would claim the promises/benefits? 
28. Are there any obligations associated to role fulfillment?  
29. Reflection of accountability issues 
30. To whom are the villagers accountable?  
 
31. Mechanisms in place for the NGO to ensure the fulfillment of promises and benefits 
from the project to the villagers? 















Appendix 4: Number of Villagers and they are Compliance type 






CV! 3! 21! 18! 3!
JV! 3! 28! 15! 13!
Ng! 2! 21! 20! 1!
NV! 3! 21! 0! 21!


























Appendix 4: Free and Prior Informed Consent Form for Participation in Research 
 
Dear, Sir/Madam 
My name is Getrude Likango, a student from the University of Oslo, Norway. I 
am conducting a study to generate information on the Villagers’ roles in the 
REDD+ Pilot Project. I wish to get information from you on the topic. The 
information thus gathered will be used to improve the REDD+ Project.  
 
You were selected to participate in the study because you are an adult who live in 
the Kolo Hills. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to 
refuse to be in this study. If you decide to participate, you are free to skip any 
question that you may not wish to answer or may not apply to your knowledge. 
 
Also, I ask you to accept the recording of the discussions for the purposes of 
avoiding missing key points. 
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Your information will remain confidential and will be used only for the purpose 
of this study. Therefore, you DO NOT need to write or provide your name 
anywhere. However, I would appreciate if you could write your signature in the 
space provided below to confirm your consent to participate in this study. 
 
Signature……………………….                                  Date………………… 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
!
 
